CHOICE Newsletter: Elections in Serbia and BiH: Different Outcomes for China

Dear reader,

Elections can change governments, but do they necessarily change how countries deal with China? At CHOICE, we have been closely following political shifts across Central and Eastern Europe and what they mean for the region’s evolving China policies. In our recently published Central and Eastern European China Policy Audit 2025–2026: Between De-Risking and Re-Engagement, we examined how Hungary’s political transformation following Viktor Orbán’s defeat could reshape Budapest’s relationship with Beijing.

This month, we turn our attention to two Western Balkan countries where elections tell rather different stories. In Serbia, the student-led movement’s victory marks a potential turning point in domestic politics, but its commitment to maintaining the strategic partnership with China suggests that political change may not translate into a fundamental foreign policy shift. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), meanwhile, the consolidation of established ethno-nationalist parties reinforces the political networks through which Beijing has long pursued its economic interests.

Beyond the Western Balkans, our Brussels Corner examines the EU’s increasingly assertive approach toward China, including the Franco-German proposal for a new trade “kill-switch.” The political appetite for tougher measures may be growing, but whether member states can agree on how to share the costs of potential Chinese retaliation remains an open question.

Enjoy the read, and as always, we welcome your thoughts and feedback!

Ivana Karásková, CHOICE Founder and Team Lead (based in Prague)

CHOICE Quick Takes

In October, Serbia and BiH went to the polls just weeks apart, but the outcomes pointed in different directions. While BiH’s elections reinforced existing ethno-nationalist power structures and a fragmented political landscape, Serbia’s brought an end to 14 years of Serbian Progressive Party rule and opened the door to political change. Our Quick Takes explore what these contrasting developments mean for China’s established networks of engagement in BiH and the future of its strategic partnership with Serbia.

Selena Orly, CHOICE Analyst and Deputy Team Lead (based in Tel Aviv)

BiH’s Elections Entrench Ethnic Divides and Preserve China’s Established Pathways of Engagement

BiH held its general elections in early October, marked by a low turnout of roughly 40 percent, that saw established ethno-nationalist parties consolidate their positions within the ethnically divided political system. Voters selected the three members of the State Presidency, the president of Republika Srpska, and over 500 deputies across state, entity, and cantonal parliaments within the country’s complex political framework. The overall outcome reinforced enduring ethno-political divides, as dominant nationalist parties representing Bosniak, Croat, and Serb communities maintained or expanded their influence.

This persistent ethnopolitical fragmentation offers a favorable operating environment for China’s footprint. Beijing has long favored direct, bilateral engagement with regional and ethnic elites, bypassing cumbersome state-level decision-making to negotiate energy and infrastructure deals directly with local powerbrokers – a process often facilitated by weak public procurement oversight and systemic patronage. The decline of liberal, civic-oriented forces further reduces political pushback against opaque Chinese investment models. Consequently, Chinese state-owned entities are well-positioned to benefit from political continuity, particularly in the Republika Srpska entity under the nationalist SNSD, where key infrastructure and energy projects of Chinese companies are underway. In the other entity, Federation of BiH, the strong standing of leading ethno-nationalist parties HDZ and SDA aligns with Beijing’s historical reliance on established elite networks.

However, China’s future economic trajectory in the country may be increasingly constrained by external pressures. In particular, accelerating US involvement driven by transactional policies focused on energy independence and infrastructure creates a far tougher competitive landscape for Chinese entities present in these sectors.

Serbia’s Elections May Reshape Domestic Politics, but They Are Unlikely to Overhaul Its Foreign Policy, Including Its Partnership with China

Snap elections on October 25 ended 14 years of Serbian Progressive Party rule. With turnout around 69 percent, the highest in decades, the Student List won an outright majority, with a preliminary 52.71 percent of the vote and 140 of 250 seats, according to the Republic Electoral Commission, against 39.17 percent and 104 seats for Aleksandar Vučić’s United Serbia list.

The Student List grew out of protests following the November 2024 concrete canopy collapse at Novi Sad railway station, which killed 16 people. A renovation of the station involving Chinese companies had been completed months earlier, and questions about the works, incomplete documentation, and delayed accountability turned the tragedy into a broader protest against corruption and institutional failure. The campaign stayed on these domestic issues and left foreign policy largely undebated. But silence is not the absence of a vision: on Kosovo, Russia, the EU, the US, and China, the Student List’s positions suggest little appetite for a radical departure from Serbia’s established course.

On China, the Student List program signals continuity in the partnership, with firmer conditions attached. It pledges to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership and expand cooperation “from economic, infrastructure, and industrial projects into high-tech investment.” Yet it also stipulates that “every future project must comply with domestic regulations, environmental standards, workers’ rights, and workplace safety.” That condition sits alongside the students’ broader calls for greater transparency in public procurement and audits of state infrastructure projects, particularly those carried out through nontransparent agreements and special legal arrangements. If these commitments are applied, Chinese companies could face greater scrutiny. However, the program does not translate its call for stricter regulatory oversight into a fundamental realignment away from China. The likely change is in the terms of engagement, not Serbia’s strategic direction.

CHOICE in Brussels

The EU’s China Deadline

October saw the EU’s China policy become more assertive on several fronts. In a joint letter to Commission President von der Leyen, Chancellor Merz and President Macron called for an instrument allowing the Commission to restrict or cut off trading partners’ access to the EU’s single market – quickly dubbed the “kill-switch.” Days later, Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič returned from Beijing with a cap on Chinese hybrid imports, starting at 350,000 vehicles. Meanwhile, the European Parliament adopted a report calling China a “decisive enabler” of Russia. At the European Council summit, EU leaders asked the Commission to “urgently enhance the EU toolbox,” with a proposal promised to be delivered by December.

One  interesting element of the Franco-German proposal is procedural: the new tool would be based on a reversed qualified majority, meaning measures would move forward unless a qualified majority of member states voted against them. No single member state, or small group of member states, could block a response at the EU level on their own. However, any new EU instrument, as always, would need the support of member states and the European Parliament. The Anti-Coercion Instrument, never triggered since its adoption in 2023, shows that a tool can exist without being used. Endorsing summit conclusions is thus one thing, but agreeing on who absorbs China’s retaliation is another. And given China’s actions toward 14 European entities placed under export controls in July, the solidarity mechanism for those targeted by Beijing put forward by the EU may therefore matter as much as the “kill-switch” itself.

WiCH Highlights

Ana Krstinovska, WiCH Co-Chair for North Macedonia, co-authored a report on China’s initiatives in Southeast Europe. Read it here!

Sari Arho Havrén, WiCH Co-Chair for Finland, spoke about Germany’s China dilemma with The Telegraph. Read it here! 

Ivana Karásková, WiCH Co-Chair for Czechia, gave an interview featured on Hybrid CoE about China’s disinformation activities and wrote an article for Internationale Politik about Hungary’s new China policy. Watch here and read here!

CHOICE News

 CHOICE organized a closed-door event in Brussels with the Polish Permanent Representation on China’s influence in Europe and its cooperation with Russia. In Warsaw, we co-organized an event with ECFR and OSW, supported by Mercator Stiftung, on CEE’s stake in shaping EU China policy.

 Sense Hofstede discussed  chips, trade, and an arrest in Brussels with The Wire China (read it here), European dependence on China with  NRC  (in Dutch; read it here), and potential Ukraine negotiations involving Trump and Xi with Seznam Zprávy (read it here).

   Konrad Szatters was featured in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in an article on China’s growing economic interest in Poland (read it here) and interviewed by Onet about how Beijing builds influence in Europe (read it here).

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