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The Crowded Geopolitical Field in Central and Southeast Europe

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On November 17-18, Taiwanese companies will gather in Warsaw to promote a technology park planned by TEEMA (Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association) in Miękinia, near Wrocław. The park builds on Taiwan’s already extensive cooperation with Poland, a country where South Korea has built significant economic and defense ties as well. Further south, Japan has been building connections and South Korea has been expanding its presence across the Western Balkans. These developments point to a broader trend: the geopolitical field in which Central and Southeast European states operate is growing more diversified.

Southeast Europe (SEE) in particular is among the regions historians describe as a terrain of the “great game,” an incessant positioning of external actors seeking to gain influence and tilt developments in favor of their geopolitical thinking. These days, thankfully, such rivalries are less consequential militarily but nonetheless significant politically. As geopolitical competition returns, most of the analytical attention regarding SEE – and to an extent Central Europe as well – has gone to legacy powers such as Russia and ambitious newcomers like China. Yet, in the meantime, a number of other foreign actors, from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to the Gulf states and Azerbaijan, have been increasingly positioning themselves across the regions’ various domains.

East Asia’s Bet on Poland

This phenomenon is especially visible in Poland. In July 2022, just months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Warsaw signed framework agreements for South Korean tanks, howitzers, and fighter jets. Four years later, the relationship is moving from “Made in Korea” to “Made in Poland,” as the Korean ambassador in Warsaw put it. The second executive contract for K2 tanks, worth $6.5 billion, provides for more than 180 K2 tanks, over 60 of which are to be assembled in Gliwice – the first overseas production of the K2 – while Hanwha Aerospace has recently started building a factory in Gorzów Wielkopolski to make guided missiles for its Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher.

Politics has followed industry. In April 2026, Donald Tusk became the first Polish prime minister to visit Seoul in 27 years and called South Korea Poland’s “most important ally after the US, especially in the defense industry.” He also noted that South Korea is already Asia’s largest investor in Poland – a position anchored by LG Energy Solution’s plant near Wrocław, which employs some 6,000 people and ranks among Europe’s largest battery factories.

Poland is the anchor, but not an exception. In the Czech Republic, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power won the contract for two new reactors at Dukovany, beating French EDF and securing Korea’s first nuclear export in 16 years. In Estonia, Hanwha Aerospace has followed sales of K9 howitzers and Chunmoo launchers with a planned investment of nearly €100 million in ammunition production and maintenance. In Hungary, Samsung SDI and SK On run battery plants that now compete in the country with Chinese giants such as CATL.

Taiwan’s approach has been quieter but follows a similar logic. Promoting a “non-red supply chain,” Taipei found in Poland its largest drone export market in 2025. Since then, two flagship industrial projects have followed: a technology park planned by TEEMA in Miękinia, near Wrocław, and an electric vehicle hub in Jaworzno, where state-owned ElectroMobility Poland chose Foxconn as its partner after originally building its plans around Chinese Geely. In October, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung visited the Miękinia site, said a memorandum on the park should be signed by the end of the year, and met with officials from Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. The trip also produced plans for the first semiconductor project between Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute and Poland’s Łukasiewicz Research Network.

For Taipei, partners with a material stake in Taiwanese capacity are more likely to care about what happens in the Taiwan Strait. For Warsaw, both Seoul and Taipei offer technology transfer and a way up the value chain – one of Poland’s most important goals for the foreseeable future. Binding agreements on the Taiwanese projects are still pending, and the Miękinia site already carries Intel’s abandoned investment on its record, but both relationships show that Poland’s and the region’s choice of partners is growing.

A Slower Pace for East Asian Engagement in SEE

Further south, East Asian engagement has been taking shape in an arguably slower manner than in Poland – and unevenly so. Japan launched its Western Balkans Cooperation Initiative back in 2018, under then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Yet, this framework has not translated into significant engagement, as most activities were tied to technical assistance, small-scale projects, and diplomatic niceties.

South Korea, by contrast, has moved faster. The traditionally business-minded Seoul has initiated a process of deepening engagement with the Western Balkans. In June 2026, Seoul and Belgrade concluded talks on a comprehensive economic partnership agreement covering ten different areas. Seoul is seeking to reproduce similar efforts in relation to other Western Balkan countries as well: an economic cooperation agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force this month, ties with North Macedonia are deepening via engagement with the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, and Seoul aims to deepen security, defense, and IT relations with Albania.

Taiwan, meanwhile, remains largely absent, with only modest efforts in the auto industry and green energy. Taiwanese policymakers are also looking at different options for higher levels of regional presence – particularly through engagement in new industries of data, microchips, and IT. 

Beyond East Asia, a Wider Game in SEE

Apart from South Korea, Japan, and, more thinly, Taiwan, even newer actors such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have entered the game in SEE. Serbia, for example, has become a partner in several significant initiatives. In 2024, Belgrade signed a $205 million loan agreement with Riyadh to implement three projects in water management, infrastructure, and energy – part of a wider initiative to deepen relations across Europe in the context of Riyadh’s Vision 2030. 

The UAE and Serbia, meanwhile, have overcome historical difficulties after a prolonged period of non-cooperation in the wake of the post-Yugoslav wars, signing a comprehensive economic partnership agreement in October 2024. The Belgrade Waterfront, a joint project with the UAE-based firm Eagle Hills, is expected to exceed €12 billion. Beyond Serbia, Saudi companies have also established a presence in other SEE countries, including in Bulgaria, where Saudi Arabia’s Arkad Engineering led the consortium awarded the contract to build the Bulgarian section of Russia’s TurkStream-related gas pipeline.

Azerbaijan is another emerging actor in SEE, using gas supplies as a positioning instrument to establish and expand its regional presence. In February 2026, Baku signed an agreement with Belgrade on a gas-fired power plant near Niš, now expected by 2030. Azerbaijan is also supplying gas to Serbia and Bulgaria, among other countries, as a source of energy diversification. These projects provide a bilateral foundation for broader cooperation, including in the field of defense.

The growing presence of new actors is adding to an already crowded regional landscape, where established players are also intensifying their engagement. Türkiye, a long-standing actor in SEE, has recently stepped up its regional engagement through political initiatives and infrastructure diplomacy. Its Balkan Peace Platform had its political premiere in Istanbul in the summer of 2025, and Ankara quickly sought to routinize the framework with a follow-up meeting in February 2026. Alongside these political initiatives, Türkiye has returned to “tarmac-and-concrete diplomacy,” offering tangible projects to local actors. One example is the revival of an earlier proposal to construct a motorway between Belgrade and Sarajevo, with Turkish funding for the Bosnian side.

A Patchwork of Partners

Central and Southeast Europe differ in several ways. In Poland and its neighbors, Korean and Taiwanese actors largely complement European capabilities in areas where the EU has struggled to develop sufficient capacity – in the defense industry, batteries, and semiconductors – and arrive as partners broadly aligned with the West. 

Further south, however, the newcomers represent a more varied set of interests and strategic orientations, and some can link up with Russian interests. In SEE, the prolonged impasse of the Western Balkans, coupled with the growing presence of new external actors, is thus making the region increasingly contested. The EU nonetheless remains by far the region’s main economic partner, accounting for over 60 percent of the Western Balkans’ total trade. Yet, while states across SEE are to varying degrees anchored in or aiming to join European and transatlantic organizations, local elites are consolidating their agency and exploring avenues of engagement with third actors – and the menu of opportunities is expanding all the time. As European institutions continue discussions about the future of SEE, they can no longer take their ability to control it for granted.

Written by

Konrad Szatters

Konrad Szatters is a China Analyst at AMO, focusing on China’s political discourse and foreign policy. He also serves as a Lead Researcher for the Ukrainian Heritage Diplomacy in China at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Previously, he gained experience at the College of Europe in Natolin, the Polish Diplomatic Academy, and the Embassy of Poland in Beijing.

Vladimir Shopov

Vladimir Shopov is a visiting fellow with the Asia programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is a consultant, researcher and columnist with 20 years of experience and has worked with numerous companies from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, UK, US and others. Shopov has also worked with the European Parliament, MEPs, the European Commission, the British Council and many other European and Asian policy and research centres. He was adviser on EU affairs to the minister of home affairs (1997-1998), counsellor at the Bulgarian mission to the EU in Brussels (1998-2001), EU adviser at the British embassy in Sofia (2002-2003) and adviser to the minister of foreign affairs (2014-2017). He is a graduate in political science and comparative politics with MA degrees from Sofia University St. Kliment of Ohrid and the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has also studied in Oxford University, London University (Queen Mary College), New School for Social Research, California State University, Peking University and King’s College London.