The dynamic rise of Chinese humanoid robotics was on full display at the 2026 World Humanoid Robot Games held in Beijing on August 22-26. China’s rapid development of humanoid robots, even if connected to entertainment, should be understood as part of a broader state-led effort to upgrade manufacturing and establish leadership in emerging strategic technologies. Chinese narratives about the applicability of robots deserve closer attention, especially considering that policymakers in Beijing increasingly frame robotics as a potential response to China’s ongoing socioeconomic problems with productivity, ageing population, labor shortages, and growing competitive rivalry.
Made in China 2025 and 15th Five-Year Plan
The policy foundations of Chinese robotization are not new, and they originate in the previous decade, when robotics and intelligent manufacturing were chosen as priorities of the “Made in China 2025” industrial policy. The 13th and especially 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP) both accelerated these efforts. The 14th and 15th FYPs specifically mentioned developing humanoid robots by promoting innovation, advanced manufacturing, and AI and industrial upgrading. The latest 15th FYP also introduced the idea of the so-called “dark factories” – fully robotized production lines not requiring factors needed by humans, such as sunlight, and therefore more predictable and efficient.
These policy guidelines were followed by funding and research efforts. China’s top technical schools, including Tsinghua University, Harbin Institute of Technology, or the prestigious Institute of Automation at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, have been involved in the development of new-generation automation, robotic components, and control systems.
Along with the boost in domestic innovation, the well-known process of acquiring knowledge abroad also began. Chinese funds were launched to buy innovative Western companies and their intellectual property. While the example of Swedish Volvo being acquired by Chinese Geely is relatively well-known, the acquisitions of companies in other critical technologies also took place – but with less publicity. Such examples in robotics are German KUKA, and the attempted acquisitions of American startups ATop Tech and Xcerra.
Why Humanoid Robotics and Who Is Building Them?
Robotized humanoids might be perceived as a potential bridge between AI and China’s existing manufacturing infrastructure. The creation of lightweight operating platforms aims to support or even – in the future – replace not only humans but also the large, heavy, and cumbersome industrial robots associated with today’s production halls. A humanoid robot is designed to be more versatile: it can operate a production line, work in a warehouse, interact with others, and participate in business fairs – multi-tasking on a single platform.
They can be designed for specific work environments, thus eliminating the necessity to prepare automation of tasks currently designed around human workers. Moreover, robots are expected to address China’s key socioeconomic issues: demographic decline and aging workforce. Robots do not age, have modernization potential, and their efficiency is not dependent on physical or mental health. They are replaceable and do not require health and safety measures. Integrated with the energy transformation planned in China, they might therefore decrease labor costs.
Among the most prominent Chinese humanoid robots’ producers are the Shanghai-based AgiBot Zhiyuan Robotics, as well as UBtech from Shenzhen, the manufacturer of the Walker series of robots, and Unitree, one of the “6 Dragons and 6 Tigers of Zhejiang.” This concentration in the southeastern provinces might be related to the particularly high activity of local business angels, such as Alibaba, the favorable attitude of the authorities of cities like Hangzhou and the large venture capital funds financed by them, as well as the regional presence of technical parks traditionally focused on machine learning and autonomy. Zhejiang is notably known as a model region in synergy between high-tech industries and governance.
From Prototypes to an Uncertain Future
The biggest actors in the robotics industry have already demonstrated their capabilities in controlled environments. This repeats a pattern previously observed in the photovoltaic and electric car industries. Rapid development of actuators and motors, batteries, sensors, computer vision, and dexterous manipulation make humanoid platforms increasingly capable in the physical sphere. The growing number of centers, and therefore the competition, are accelerating the transition from demonstrations to industrial applications. However, humanoid robots’ digital autonomy and real independence remain an enigma. The two phenomena that will shape the industry’s trajectory therefore are real-life deployments, and AI and embodied intelligence.
Despite their improving mobility, robots still seem to remain applied mainly in entertainment (marketing) or education. Their actual operational parameters, such as lifting weight or durability, are not available to the public, and many of those available commercially and wholesale remain piloted or designed for a narrow range of functions.
This raises questions about the AI readiness of Chinese robots. Research is progressing but remains limited to a small group of specialists and teams, primarily based in Beijing and Shenzhen. Since the policy to support research on embodied AI was announced in 2025 and published in February 2026, these are still relatively new initiatives – and might still be tested. Patent activity research, for example, shows that although Chinese inventors have made significant progress in physical components and in single scripts regulating specific narrow-scope tasks, robots still lack true multitasking capabilities enabling multi-domain utilization in a pool of tasks comparable to, for example, skilled manual or service workers. Similar conclusions come from articles in China’s largest academic journal on robotics – 机器人 (Jīqìrén – robot).
Recent reports from China, such as the opinion of the National Development and Reform Commission from August 2026, indicate that Chinese officials are, on one hand, aware of high expectations regarding the humanoid robots sector, and on the other, of the growing overproduction threatening in another area of the Chinese economy.
Governmental agencies are beginning to demand massive funding for progress, with industrial deployment seen as the immediate priority. This is important because certain provinces, in the face of foreign competition, need drastic cost cutting, mainly in warehousing, mass production, courier services, and repetitive tasks. More specialized sectors are also waiting for the real “embodied AI” to be integrated with digital services and installed in humanoid robots for the sake of basic medical care, care for the elderly and the disabled, and household care.
Making Toys and Industrial Power
Chinese robots also generate great publicity domestically and internationally, as they are presented at trade fairs and are dancing during Chinese and international holidays. They are also frequently featured in social media. However, their presence and sophistication are generating growing suspicion. Particularly interesting was the case from Poland, where a video featuring a Unitree-built robot visiting a Polish naval base became viral. The robot was “invited” by the facility staff to advertise the upcoming Fleet Day, which sparked a public debate and brought about questions about the security of strategic infrastructure.
The coming years will show whether robotization remain “progress for the sake of progress” or will turn into real competitive advantages. China may have an industrial advantage without yet having a viable humanoid-robot industry. Robotics emerged as a convergence of China’s three major priorities: self-reliance, industrial upgrading and productivity growth. The extensive use of technological clichés in marketing and propaganda could here again lead to the capacity growing faster than demand. The key question is whether China can industrialize humanoid robotics at scale and reasonably lower the cost of their operation.
Written by
Krzysztof Karwowski
Krzysztof Karwowski is a Doctoral Fellow at SGH Warsaw School of Economics. His research focuses on Chinese science policy and China’s space program. He is also a tech Editor at “Układ Sił” magazine.
