Georgia’s China Pivot: An Illusion of Alternatives?

This June, Georgia and China upgraded their bilateral relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” with Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party presenting the announcement as evidence that Tbilisi has meaningful alternatives beyond the West. The move came almost three years after the two countries first elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership in 2023.

At that time, the logic behind closer relations with Beijing appeared relatively straightforward. Georgia sought to strengthen its position as a transit hub between Europe and Asia, while China was interested in the Middle Corridor and Georgia’s strategic location on the Black Sea. Trade between the two countries was expanding, with Chinese companies being involved in infrastructure projects, and the prospect of Chinese participation in the Anaklia Deep Sea Port appeared to provide a tangible economic dimension to the relationship. Three years later, however, the picture is considerably less impressive.

The relationship has undoubtedly become more politically prominent, but its material achievements remain limited. Despite the increasing significance of the Middle Corridor, Chinese investment in Georgia remains marginal, trade has not transformed Georgia’s economic position, the flagship Anaklia project has long remained stalled, and Beijing has offered little meaningful diplomatic support on issues of core importance to Tbilisi. This raises a broader question of whether Georgia’s strategic hedging is turning into strategic illusion.

From Economic Pragmatism to Political Signaling

Georgia’s engagement with China did not begin as an explicitly geopolitical alternative to the West. For much of the 2010s, the relationship was driven primarily by economic pragmatism. Georgia joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 and signed a free trade agreement with Beijing the following year. Trade turnover increased rapidly, while Chinese companies became involved in major infrastructure projects, including roads and other transport links. For Tbilisi and Beijing, this made sense as both were interested in exploring the possibility of Georgia becoming a strategic bridge between Europe and Asia.

The Middle Corridor has strengthened this logic significantly. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the resulting disruption of established trade routes have substantially moved attention toward alternative routes through Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Black Sea. Georgia has consequently become more important as a potential transit state.

The 2023 strategic partnership therefore appeared to be a logical extension of the economic links between Georgia and China. However, since then, for Tbilisi, the political meaning attached to its relations with Beijing has become considerably greater than its economic weight. For Georgian Dream, China increasingly serves not only as an economic partner but also as evidence that Georgia has supposed alternatives to its increasingly challenging relations with the EU and the US.

What Has Georgia Actually Gained?

The record since 2023 does not suggest a transformation of Georgia’s economic relationship with Beijing. Chinese foreign direct investment in Georgia dwindled from $98 million in 2023 to $29 million in 2024. By the first quarter of 2026, China accounted for only 4.6 percent of total foreign direct investment. China was also not among Georgia’s top five export markets.

On the other hand, Chinese tourism to Georgia increased substantially following the introduction of visa-free travel in 2024. Chinese visitors rose by 83 percent in 2024 and another 44 percent in 2025. Three Chinese airlines have also established routes to Georgia, improving connectivity between the two countries. Nonetheless, these developments are difficult to characterize as evidence of a comprehensive strategic transformation. Chinese tourists still represent only a relatively small share of Georgia’s overall tourism arrivals, while increased air connectivity is important but hardly equivalent to a geopolitical realignment.

The same is true for the updated China-Georgia free trade agreement. The original agreement has existed since 2017, and the more recent update was largely technical rather than a fundamental restructuring of economic relations.

Alignment with a Different Calculus

Small states – such as Georgia – often engage in strategic hedging when caught between competing major powers. Rather than choosing one side completely, they maintain relationships with several actors simultaneously, preserving room for maneuver. In the case of Georgia and China, this strategy initially made sense. Maintaining strong ties with the EU and the US while developing economic relations with China could help diversify Georgia’s partnerships without necessarily undermining its Western orientation. However, the problem is that hedging requires balance.

As Georgia’s relations with its Western partners have deteriorated over democratic backsliding, the political value of the relationship with China has changed. Beijing increasingly provides the ruling Georgian Dream with a way of demonstrating that Western pressure does not leave Georgia without alternatives. The upgrade of the strategic partnership therefore matters even if it is a façade and produces few immediate economic consequences. Its value is more political than material.

There is also a danger of interpreting China’s approach to Tbilisi only through Georgian Dream’s political rhetoric. Beijing does not necessarily need to fully replace the EU or the US in Georgia to benefit from the relationship, as it has little incentive to do so when it can preserve access and influence without assuming the political, financial, and strategic costs that such a role would entail. Maintaining a relationship with Tbilisi already gives Beijing access and options at relatively low cost. This makes the “comprehensive strategic partnership” useful to both sides – but in very different ways.

Strategic Hedging or an Illusion?

There is nothing inherently irrational about Georgia seeking closer economic ties with China. A small state can benefit from diversifying its economic relationships, attracting investment from multiple sources, and making use of its geographical position. But the important question is what Georgia expects this relationship to deliver – and whether it can develop the material foundations to meet those expectations.

The evolution of Sino-Georgian relations suggests that the partnership is likely to remain an important part of Tbilisi’s efforts to broaden its external relationships. The 2023 strategic partnership marked a significant diplomatic step, while its recent upgrade indicates the government’s intention to deepen cooperation with Beijing. Nevertheless, a comprehensive strategic partnership that produces little additional investment, limited diplomatic support, and uncertain infrastructure delivery remains comprehensive largely in name.

For now, Georgia is hedging, but if the value of it increasingly lies in convincing others that Tbilisi has alternatives rather than actually creating those alternatives, then the strategy risks becoming something else. Strategic hedging becomes strategic illusion when the political value of an alternative becomes greater than its material reality. And that may be precisely where Georgia’s relationship with China stands today.