The Chinese-Russian Digital Iron Curtain

In August 2025, Russian authorities began gradually blocking phone calls on WhatsApp and Telegram. At first, they justified these restrictions with vague excuses, such as national security and protecting users from spam calls. However, it seems more likely that the reasons were connected to the long-standing tensions between the Russian regime and these two messaging apps, as they resist to provide user data to law enforcement as required by Russian law.

Simultaneously, VK, Russia’s tech company with close ties to the Kremlin, has launched a new app: MAX. This development shed a new light onto the actions of Russian authorities and the latest disruptions of mobile internet services in Moscow as they started to look as if their predominant goal could have also been to eliminate competition for MAX.

Cyberspace Collaboration

MAX integrates messaging functions with financial services and the government platform Gosuslugi – much like Chinese WeChat, which blends messaging, payments, social media platforms, and various other functions into a single app. Similarly to WeChat, this hands authorities potential surveillance powers and comes amid serious privacy and censorship worries, including no end-to-end encryption, broad data access by authorities, and mandatory preinstallation on all devices sold in Russia.

The similarities between MAX and WeChat, as well as China and Russia’s paths toward creating their own digital ecosystems, indicate that the cyberspace is yet another area where these two countries are drawing closer to each other. Furthermore, Molniya, another brand-new app which allows for communication, browsing social content, payments, cross-border trade, and business services, is being developed collaboratively by Russia and China as an alleged response to the rapidly growing tourist flow and cross-border activities between these two countries.

The examples of MAX and Molniya suggest that Russia is increasingly seeking inspiration from China in the realms of technology and app design – but the confluence does not stop there. The growing alignment between Chinese and Russian approaches to cyberspace governance and digital communication may also point to a deeper policy convergence between the two countries, reflecting their shared preference for greater state control over digital infrastructures and information flows.

Convergence of Chinese and Russian Policies

Chinese authorities started restricting the most popular Western and American platforms already in 2009, with prominent examples being Facebook, Twitter (now X), and YouTube. Over time, Instagram, Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp were also added to that list. The official reasons given were concerns over political stability, but at the core it seemed more about censorship, control, and digital isolation.

In the meanwhile, Chinese tech companies have developed alternatives, such as Weibo or Baidu. In contrast to Western apps, they require registration via official documents, often complemented by a Chinese phone number. As the companies creating them remain under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, by law, are obliged to permit the CCP access the data or internal systems if required, Beijing is now in possession of powerful legal and technological tools to continuously access its citizens’ data.

In the case of Russia, similar approaches could have been observed already back in 2019, when the government introduced the so-called “sovereign internet law.” It required building centralized infrastructure to manage data flows across the network, enabling Russian authorities to potentially isolate it from the global internet in the event of perceived threats to stability or security.

Nonetheless, the visible convergence of Chinese and Russian methods gained traction only after Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022. It started with Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter/X being banned in 2022, then Signal in 2024. Restrictions on YouTube, Telegram and WhatsApp are being gradually imposed as we speak. As in the case of China, Russia also started introducing its own apps, such as MAX or Molniya. Furthermore, last July, Russia introduced a new law penalizing the internet searches for “extremist” content. The definition of “extremist” in this context is fluid and broadens the scope for censorship, which leads to Russian citizens practicing self-censorship out of concern.

This demonstrates a common Chinese-Russian approach to cyberspace control. Beijing and Moscow’s understanding of digital sovereignty prioritizes the stability and security of the regime over freedom of information and data protection. This alignment promotes deeper technological and ideological cooperation between them, while further isolating both China and Russia from the rest of the world.

Spreading the Influence

Since MAX can initially only be used with Russian and Belarusian SIM cards, the residents of Russia and Belarus could eventually become digitally isolated and a digital echo chamber could appear – much like in China. This displays Russia’s firm grip on the communication within its own land, but also in Belarus and the territories it occupies in Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether the same modus operandi would expand to other parts of the world like Africa where Russia – and China – are already active.

Both China and Russia have multilayered strategies on how to approach Africa, ranging from hard to soft power methods. For example, recently, disinformation campaigns and interference in elections have intensified in Africa, and Russia, amongst other things, has been accused of suppressing the opposition in the Central African Republic.

Russia and China’s methods in Africa often take advantage of the existing anti-European sentiments. Russia makes use of the help of local influencers who understand local sensitivities. China, on the other hand, has increased its presence through state media and own diplomatic accounts on social media platforms. Regardless of this discrepancy, Russia and China’s activities in Africa are becoming increasingly aligned given their shared values and objectives – such as challenging the Western hegemony and undermining democratic institutions in the continent.

The spread of apps such as MAX or Molniya could certainly add another layer to Russia and China’s influence-spreading activities in Africa and the Global South generally, thus weakening the EU’s relations with African countries. It is even more the case considering that the EU has no strong partners in Africa and tends to act silently rather than proactively on the continent, thereby undermining its own influence-spreading efforts.

What It Means for the EU

The launch of MAX advances Russia’s efforts to create a ‘sovereign digital ecosystem,’ aimed at strengthening digital control and enhancing surveillance capabilities of the state. It also signals deepening ties with China and the construction of a parallel digital realm.

The EU has already overlooked China’s shift toward digital authoritarianism and must now pay close attention to Russia’s digital progress, as well as the growing collaboration between Russia and China in this domain. As the EU is grappling with Beijing in the 5G race, China pioneers a new frontier with 6G. China’s heavy investments in this technology and the failure to set joint standards could lead to a digital division of the world into a Western and Chinese-Russian bloc.

If China and Russia succeed in shaping and exporting their digital architectures abroad, more authoritarian and control-based approach to cyberspace could potentially become normalized, and the EU could find itself forced to adapt rather than shape the next generation of global connectivity. In other words, if no actions are taken, the EU might soon awaken to a world divided by a digital Iron Curtain which could undermine European security, unity, and ambitions in the digital realm.