Kinmen Is Unlikely to Become Taiwan’s Crimea

This article was originally published in The Diplomat and is republished here with the permission of the author.

China’s gray zone and cognitive warfare tactics are one issue; a Crimea-like scenario is another. We should not confuse the two.

As a China and Taiwan analyst, the so-called Kinmen issue has been on my mind, especially amid Xi Jinping’s increasing intimidation of Taiwan. I have to admit that it was very easy for me to imagine why Xi would want to seize Kinmen (or/and the Matsu Islands, or even the Pescadores) and then wait and see what the United States and the world would do. Annexing Kinmen and Matsu in particular seems very easy given their geographical proximity and the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), or – even easier – the option of cutting off Kinmen’s water supply from the PRC. 

This scenario seems very appealing – easy, cheap, and a good way to test Taiwan’s defense capabilities, US commitments, and the free world’s true adherence to international law. But after visiting Kinmen and talking to people in Taiwan about this particular scenario, I realized that my assumptions were, at the very least, oversimplified.

I fully agree with Sam Goodman’s thesis, put forth in a recent Diplomat article, that Kinmen is the frontline of China’s gray zone operations against Taiwan. I also agree with his recommendations that the international community should be aware of and consider the possibility that a crisis between China and Taiwan could begin with the annexation of Kinmen. No scenario can be ruled out. 

However, I disagree with Goodman’s main idea that Beijing could follow the Crimea example and use Russia’s playbook of “encouraging local actors to publicly push for reunification,” which would “create a smokescreen for the PRC to annex Kinmen.” China’s gray zone and cognitive warfare tactics are one issue; a Crimea-like scenario is another. We should not confuse the two. The latter, in my view, is too simplistic and unlikely to happen in Kinmen for five reasons.

First of all, when it comes to Crimea, it held a unique status even before Russia’s seizure of the territory: the Autonomous Republic of Crimea governed most of the peninsula, with the separate municipality of Sevastopol within Ukraine covering the rest. Crimea has its own parliament and government with powers over agriculture, public infrastructure, and tourism. Kinmen is not an autonomous region of Taiwan, so comparing it to Crimea is very risky. 

Second, the Crimean referendum in 2014 was something new and unexpected at the time. The fact that we are now discussing a repeat of this scenario in the case of Kinmen makes it less possible because of the lack of surprise. In the case of China’s so-called ‘reunification’ with Taiwan, surprise is one of the prerequisites for Beijing’s victory. Even if Xi Jinping decides to annex Kinmen and does so without any problem, for example as the result of a referendum (which is unlikely – a good example, mentioned by Goodman himself, is the Taiwanese government’s reaction to the proposed referendum on the Xiamen-Kinmen bridge), it would be clear to the international community, especially the United States, what Xi’s real intentions are – preparation for an attack on, or at least a blockade of, all of Taiwan. No surprise whatsoever.  

On the contrary, China’s seizure of Kinmen could give Taiwan, the United States, and the rest of the international law-abiding world an opportunity to better prepare for the escalation of the crisis and to coordinate their actions. Even if the US does nothing in the case of Kinmen and limits its response to verbal condemnation – which is actually very unlikely, since annexation would be a unilateral change in the status quo, which the US officially opposes – this does not mean that nothing will happen in the region. Taiwan’s government (especially the current one led by the Democratic Progressive Party) will certainly respond in some way.

This means that the outbreak of a hot kinetic conflict following a PRC annexation of Kinmen is quite likely, and other regional powers such as Japan, but also the US, would be involved whether they like it or not. I doubt whether this scenario of Kinmen annexation – from China’s point of view a baby step that could turn into a full-scale war – is in Beijing’s interest. In short, a repeat of Crimea in the case of Kinmen and Taiwan is not very feasible. 

Third, and following on from the second argument: Xi’s primary goal is to “reunify” all of Taiwan (and then have access to the first island chain). Given the differences between Ukraine and Taiwan in terms of geography and terrain (an island, a mountainous area, highly variable and violent weather conditions, etc.), China’s blockade or attack should cover the whole of Taiwan and must be carried out by surprise. Only under these circumstances can the PLA succeed. Simply taking Kinmen and waiting would be counterproductive.

Fourth, it is a bridge too far to assume that the people of Kinmen, who – as Goodman has rightly pointed out – vote overwhelmingly for the Kuomintang (KMT), want to live in the PRC. Supporting the KMT is not the same as supporting unification with China. It is worth noting that the KMT, like the DPP, is officially opposed to unification (even former President Ma Ying-jeou, famed for his administration’s reconciliation with China, rejected unification as one of the “three noes”). 

Instead, the people of Kinmen want a stable and peaceful life, so they believe it is better to be ruled by the KMT – which is perceived in Beijing as a China-friendly party – than the DPP, which is seen in the PRC as a party of ‘Taiwan independence’ provocateurs who seek to make China-Taiwan relations unstable. In other words, this may be a pragmatic approach on the part of the Kinmen people. This may also explain why the Taiwan People’s Party and Ko Wen-jie were quite popular in Kinmen in the recent elections on January 13. 

Finally, from Beijing’s point of view, there seems to be no logical reason for the annexation of Kinmen (with an important caveat: we do not know what Xi Jinping really thinks and how he perceives reality). If Xi argues that the KMT is the best option for Taiwan as a ruling party, what would be the logic of attacking an island whose people consequently vote for the KMT and are well connected to China? Punishing KMT supporters would also be hard to understand from Beijing’s point of view.