This article is based on a longer piece originally published in the Green European Journal.
All European Green parties know that Europe is the fastest-warming continent and needs to cut emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030. Yet roughly two-thirds of the 38 Green parties examined here do not address the extent to which this goal has heavily depended on China or the implications of this dependence. Among those that do, positions differ in emphasis, but most are skeptical. To advance climate goals while preserving Europe’s energy sovereignty and economic competitiveness, Green parties should strengthen their China expertise and develop more comprehensive China policies.
Do European Greens Think About China?
As shown in the table below, only 13 out of the 37 Green parties examined for this article explicitly mention China in their program. The remaining 25 make no mention of China. This gap is not confined to smaller or electorally marginal parties: some of the most successful Green parties also offer no indication of how they approach China.
The examined parties were selected based on the European Green Party (EGP) membership list and national party databases. The EGP list includes more than 38 members and not all EGP members were examined here. The ones not selected for this study either do not have an active website, or did not publicize their program. Some of the examined parties are not EGP members but remain relevant in national contexts. Where a party’s program does not mention China policy but the table nonetheless attributes a position to it, the data are based on the author’s interviews with party representatives.
The Danish Green Left, for example, criticized the former government’s engagement with China in 2021, but has remained relatively silent on the issue in recent years. This is even more striking given that, since June 2026, the party has been part of the new government that has continued to engage with China. A similar example is the British Greens, which have recently made electoral gains in local elections and have representatives in the House of Commons. Although foreign policy has been central to their campaign, the party has devoted little attention to articulating its position on China.
The picture is not uniformly bleak. Some Green parties have established track records of electoral success alongside more developed China policies. These include the Austrian, German, and Finnish Greens.
Common Threads on China: Human Rights, Security, and Technology
The Green parties that take a position on China are generally skeptical of the country, although their concerns vary. First, a focus on human rights is a nearly universal feature of their positions. This is consistent with findings by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung on Green foreign policy more broadly: Greens generally demonstrate a strong commitment to a values-based foreign policy, with an emphasis on promoting democracy and human rights.
Second, the Green parties frequently highlight the growing security risks associated with China. In terms of geopolitical challenges, the Finnish Greens’ program warns against Chinese influence in the Arctic, China’s presence in the South China Sea, and the reluctance to condemn Russia. Other risks include dependencies in critical infrastructure, critical materials, as well as surveillance risks enabled by Chinese technologies such as CCTV systems.
Third, only Greens/EFA, Austrian, German, and Spanish Greens address China’s dominance of renewables manufacturing and highlight threats to European competitiveness. They emphasize the need to de-risk from China while developing European industrial policy focused on green technologies. This position is most clearly articulated by the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament. As Markéta Gregorová, a Czech Pirate MEP in the group, puts it: “limiting purchases from China and buying more expensive European green technologies is an investment into the future.” Beyond economic considerations, Chinese-made solar panel inverters have also been flagged as a security risk because of their remote-connectivity functions.
Who Is Who
Which parties hold these positions, and how strongly? While the degree of threat perception varies among Green parties, most share some fundamental positions on China policy. The most vocal China-skeptic Greens include the Germans, French, Finnish, Austrian, Luxembourgish, and the Greens/EFA. Other parties with a less pronounced, but still skeptical stance include the Swiss, Scottish, Italian, Belgian, and Serbian Greens.
An exception is the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, a green-conservative party. In its 2024 program, the party pledged to “restore constructive relations with China based on the principles of international law, state sovereignty and mutual respect.” This framing is, of course, rooted in the specific national context, but remains noticeably warmer than the positions expressed by other Green parties. Lithuania also has a center-left Green party, Demokratai Vardan Lietuvos, which presents a different direction for the country’s China policy. Although its program does not mention China by name, the party suggests “strengthening defense and security ties with Japan, South Korea and other Southeast Asian democracies.” Its co-founder also described himself as “a fan” of Lithuania’s rapprochement with Taiwan. Based on this sample, Green parties’ positions on China, where explicitly articulated, are overwhelmingly skeptical.
Green parties’ skepticism toward China is sometimes expressed through criticism of their own governments’ engagement with Beijing rather than of China itself. Opposing the government’s China policy has been a key feature of the Hungarian LMP’s positioning under Orbán and is a mainstay for the Serbian Green-left Front (Zeleno-levi Front). “As an opposition party, we are not trying to criticise China as much as we are trying to criticise our regime’s ties to China,” said Marko Vujačić, the party’s international secretary. He also confirmed that the party has avoided aligning itself with or expressing admiration for the CCP, unlike other Serbian left-wing movements. Nevertheless, their criticism stems from a left-wing perspective, focusing primarily on the environmental damage associated with Chinese investment in copper and gold mining, as well as exploitative working conditions in Chinese-owned factories.
Can Greens Be a Leftist Alternative?
Although going green does not always mean going left – for instance, the German Greens are closer to the liberal centre, and the Austrian Greens formed a coalition government with the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) in 2020 – Green foreign policy is generally associated with left-wing or left-leaning values.
That does not mean Green parties’ foreign policies align with those of leftist parties. China is among the issues where Green and leftist parties can be misaligned. This is particularly striking in the European Parliament, where Greens/EFA and The Left recently voted very differently on China. While most Green MEPs supported a proportionate EU response if China does not open its markets, as well as urging China to use its influence over Russia to end the war in Ukraine, most MEPs from The Left voted against the resolution.
The divide is also found at the national level, including Serbia, the Czech Republic, and, very visibly, France. The French Les Écologistes clearly distinguish themselves from the pro-Beijing position of the radical-left La France Insoumise. Their leader, Marine Tondelier, reaffirms strong positions on human rights and democratic values, and advocates for a pragmatic, unified European approach to engagement with Beijing, including cooperation with China on “segments of mutual interest.” However, Tondelier argues that the “industrialization and electrification of Europe should be driven by European companies” and that Chinese investment should be “limited, controlled, and contingent upon sustainable concessions” on technology transfers.
A Unified Green Approach to China Could Benefit Europe
China divides parties on the left, but the challenge it poses for Europe cuts across the political spectrum. Beijing’s increased support for Russia’s war efforts despite Western sanctions, together with espionage activities across the continent and other forms of pressure, has made China a tangible security concern. This creates an opening for Green parties which already have a strong China position to build broader coalitions and find common ground with parties that would normally not be likely allies.
Yet, other Greens will be unable to seize that opportunity unless they close their policy gap. Sustaining the green transition requires a solid understanding and a clear policy position on the current EU-China dynamics and China’s dominance in electric vehicles, batteries, and solar and wind exports. Green parties bring expertise on climate, and if they deepen their China competence, the combined know-how would be highly beneficial for Europe’s search for a coherent China strategy.
Written by
Paulína Ovečková
Paulína Ovečková is an analyst at China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) and MapInfluenCE projects. She specializes in Chinese foreign policy, political economy, media influence, migration, and China’s engagement in the Global South. She holds master’s degrees in Chinese Studies and Economic Policy and International Relations from Masaryk University, gaining professional experience as a media analyst and researcher in the private sector, and at the Slovak Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei.
