Azerbaijan and the C6: Fueling a Strategic Autonomy Pivot in Central Asia

In November 2025, Azerbaijan formally joined the Central Asian Consultative Meeting (C5), a regional cooperation platform of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, transforming the initiative into the C6. 

In February 2026, Baku hosted a major C6 conference, where officials from all six countries discussed turning the format into a more institutionalized platform, including regular coordination mechanisms on transport, logistics, and economic policy. While Azerbaijan’s membership in the Central Asian initiative seems to be procedural, its implications may prove far-reaching. For the first time, Central Asia’s consultative mechanism expanded beyond the region’s formal boundaries to include a state that serves as a gateway to Türkiye and European markets.

The timing of Azerbaijan’s accession was particularly significant, as it coincided with Xi Jinping’s second Central Asia-China summit in Astana, underscoring the degree to which regional institutional shifts intersect with Beijing’s westward connectivity strategy. For China, the emergence of the C6 strengthens the Middle Corridor, which serves as an increasingly important alternative to Russia-centric transit routes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

Nevertheless, Baku’s addition to the original C5 could complicate China’s influence in the region by institutionalizing regional coordination, reinforcing multi-vector diplomacy, and expanding space for Western actors across Eurasia. While the C6 is not destined to turn into a new integration bloc overnight, it could serve as a solid platform for functional regionalism, allowing states to coordinate while reinforcing their strategic independence.

From A Consultative Initiative to a Regional Strategic Platform 

The C6 is not conceived as a geopolitical bloc. Launched in 2018 at the initiative of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the C6 was designed as a confidence-building forum after decades of fragmented regional relations in the post-Soviet era. The creation of the C6 was partly shaped by the precedent set by the US-led C5+1 format launched in 2015, which familiarized Central Asian leaders with regularized regional coordination. By establishing a forum without external powers in 2018, however, the five Central Asian states adapted this model to assert greater regional ownership while retaining the flexibility to engage outside powers. Its original purpose was deliberately modest: to normalize dialogue, address cross-border issues, and strengthen regional stability.

For several years, the C6 remained a lightweight, non-institutional format as its members, influenced by their histories, prioritized sovereignty and non-alignment. However, that calculus dramatically changed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The weaponization of energy and transit infrastructure as well as sweeping Western sanctions against the Kremlin changed Central Asia’s economic geography, accelerating its efforts to diversify export corridors and reduce strategic dependence. Simultaneously, China had already managed to become the region’s largest trading partner by steadily expanding its presence since 2013 under the BRI, providing an estimated USD 25 billion in loans and investments to the C6 in the first half of 2025 alone. At the same time, the US revitalized its languishing C5+1 framework, celebrating its 10th anniversary in 2025 and preparing for the first-ever White House summit with Central Asian presidents, driven by growing interest in critical minerals, rare earths, and diversified supply chains. The EU also began emphasizing its Global Gateway initiatives across the Caspian wider region. The C6 thus found a new momentum to become a regional coordination platform.

More Connectivity with More Strategic Autonomy

Recent debates increasingly point to the institutionalization of Central Asian cooperation, with proposals to transform the consultative format into a more structured mechanism, suggesting that the C6 could evolve into a more durable platform. Azerbaijan’s addition to the group is a logical step, as Baku is an extension of the Middle Corridor and the western anchor of the Caspian Sea. At the same time, Baku’s Alat port, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and South Caucasus gas pipeline form an indispensable bridge for Beijing’s westward connectivity expansion.

Azerbaijan’s participation synchronizes Central Asia and the South Caucasus into a unified political-economic space, and what had previously been a fragmented corridor now acquires a single operational logic. Joint Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan initiatives on logistics digitalization already allow cargo to move from China to Europe with unified documentation, reducing delays and transaction costs. 

For China, this new connectivity creates both opportunities and constraints. Since 2022, rising risks along Russia’s Northern Corridor have increased the strategic value of the Middle Corridor. Although it remains less cost-effective, its geopolitical diversification is its key advantage. Azerbaijan’s accession enhances coordination and predictability across the Caspian Sea, which is increasingly important for Beijing.

Yet Azerbaijan also brings strong leverage. With a GDP of roughly USD 79 billion, it is the C6’s third-largest economy, raising the bloc’s combined GDP to approximately USD 650 billion. Unlike several other Central Asian states, Baku is not dependent on Chinese financing. Its diversified energy exports, strong ties with Türkiye and Europe, and restored territorial integrity following the resolution of the Karabakh conflict allow Baku to shape corridor governance rather than simply absorb it.

To date, China remains Central Asia’s largest economic partner, but economic scale has not yet translated into political dominance. The C6 reinforces this dynamic as Central Asian states continue practicing multi-vector diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s pursuit of supply-chain diplomacy in Washington, where it has positioned itself as a critical minerals partner amid US-China decoupling, illustrates this approach. Uzbekistan invests in Afghanistan, supplying electricity and developing southern connectivity routes through Iran and Pakistan. Additionally, in November 2025, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan joined a six-nation rail agreement aimed at shifting more China-Europe freight through Iran.

Azerbaijan’s equidistant foreign policy seamlessly fits into this pattern. Having avoided exclusive alignment with any major power, Baku strengthens the C6’s collective ability to diversify partnerships and reduce overdependence on Beijing without antagonizing it. Its active engagement with China, Türkiye, Europe, and the US shows that participation in the Middle Corridor and BRI-linked projects can coexist with alternative partnerships, ensuring that Central Asia retains strategic autonomy and avoids becoming overly reliant on Beijing.

Greater connectivity with Europe could also play an important role as Azerbaijan’s participation further reinforces the South Caucasus and Central Asia as Europe’s gateway to the East. A more institutionalized C6 could provide the EU with a more effective framework for advancing initiatives under the Global Gateway strategy, supporting infrastructure and digital connectivity. While China is likely to remain a major economic actor, greater regional coordination creates additional space for European engagement, allowing the EU to deepen its presence without forcing regional states into exclusive geopolitical alignments. Thus, for Europe, the emergence of a more coordinated C6 that includes Azerbaijan presents an opportunity to engage with a stronger regional platform rather than a collection of individual states. 

From Bilateral Asymmetry toward Multilateral Bargaining

Azerbaijan’s entry into the C6 can help transform it into a more coherent and self-reliant initiative. Energy aggregation could play a central role: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are major oil suppliers, Turkmenistan provides gas, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together account for over half of global uranium production. Combined, the C6 forms a formidable energy cluster with growing relevance for European and Asian markets. For China, however, this is a double-edged game. Even though Beijing would remain a key buyer and investor for the decade to come, a more coordinated Eurasian energy space would boost the region’s bargaining power. 

Additionally, an ever-increasing European demand for freight transportation through the Middle Corridor could gradually limit China’s ability to secure exclusive access or preferential pricing. Security without alignment could easily complement Central Asia’s increasing strategic autonomy. The resolution of the Karabakh conflict and new infrastructure initiatives, such as the Trans-Caspian Fiber Optic Cable Line and Caspian Subsea Direct Current, could significantly improve predictability along the trans-Caspian routes. While the C6 would benefit China with reduced conflict risks and infrastructure protection, it could constrain Beijing’s justification for deeper unilateral involvement.

The US factor adds another dimension to the region’s new calculus. Debates in Washington about expanding the C5+1 underscore the growing strategic centrality of the Middle Corridor. The US’ interest in critical minerals and supply-chain diversification creates external leverage that the C6 can selectively harness. 

The New Eurasian Environment

Azerbaijan’s accession to the C6 could mark a pivotal shift in Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape. By linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus and Türkiye, the bloc could consolidate the Middle Corridor – aggregating energy and industrial capacity and strengthening regional leverage. For China, this development would provide more reliable connectivity, safer corridors for BRI investments, and greater predictability along critical trade and energy routes. 

However, the C6’s growing autonomy and collective agency could substantially constrain Beijing’s ability to exert unilateral influence. Coordinated energy exports, diversified transit options, and deeper engagement with Ankara and the West could weaken China’s asymmetric leverage in the region. As the countries across the Middle Corridor become increasingly multi-vector, China could soon face a strategic choice: adapt its BRI strategy to a multilateral framework or risk losing preferential access to Eurasia’s core infrastructure and markets. This raises the question of whether and how China can adjust to this new Eurasian environment.