Interlinked Instability: Why CEE and the Indo-Pacific Must Stand Together

This article is based on the research paper “Interlinked Instability: Central and Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape” by Pavel Havlíček, Ivana Karásková, and Danila Naumov, published by the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in February 2025.

The global security landscape has undergone profound changes in recent years, characterized by the rise of revisionist powers and the weakening of the rules-based international order. Two regions stand at the forefront of these challenges: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), confronting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific, where China’s assertive actions continue to raise tensions well beyond the Taiwan Strait.

Despite their geographic distance, CEE and the Indo-Pacific thus face similar economic, political and security challenges, especially when it comes to their authoritarian neighbors. As regional conflicts become increasingly interconnected, the war in Ukraine offers critical lessons not just for Taiwan but for the broader Indo-Pacific region.

The Sino-Russian Partnership

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, China has attempted to position itself as a neutral power promoting peace and stability. However, its actions tell a different story. Beyond the infamous Xi-Putin meeting that established the “no limits” partnership just weeks before Russia’s invasion, China has effectively sustained Russia’s war efforts through financial collaboration, technology transfers, and the circumvention of international sanctions. Among these forms of bilateral support, the transfer of dual-use technology and components has been flagged as particularly concerning.

Moreover, Beijing has advanced peace proposals that largely mirror Russian positions while criticizing Western peace initiatives. This was evident most recently when China declined to participate in the Switzerland peace conference in June 2024.

In contrast to Beijing’s ambiguity, which has raised concerns about its reliability as a partner and mediator, Japan’s response has been markedly different. Despite decades of pragmatic neutrality, Japan swiftly provided unconditional support for Ukraine, even at significant costs to its own national interests, including energy cooperation with Moscow.

South Korea initially adopted a more cautious approach, balancing its support for Ukraine against regional security concerns. However, North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia’s war efforts in late 2024 prompted Seoul to reassess its position. With Russia and North Korea forming an increasingly entrenched authoritarian alliance, South Korea has drawn closer to Western partners to counter this emerging threat.

The Shifting Landscape and CEE Perspectives

For Central and Eastern European states, particularly those most threatened by Russia’s actions – i.e., Poland, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic – China’s stance on Ukraine has fundamentally altered their approach to Beijing. Previous attempts to balance relations with China as a counterweight to Russia have been abandoned, as these countries now view Beijing as an enabler of Russian aggression.

This reflects a broader shift in Central and Eastern Europe, where initial enthusiasm for Chinese investment has largely given way to disillusionment due to unfulfilled economic promises. The cooperation platform between China and CEE (originally known as the 16+1) now functions as a “zombie format,” especially since the withdrawal of the Baltic states. As China’s role in CEE diminishes due to its tacit support for Russia’s aggression and regional cohesion fractures, China has prioritized bilateral relations with countries like Hungary, while others have aligned themselves more firmly with EU and NATO positions.

CEE states have also embraced more constructive engagement with other Indo-Pacific countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. These are seen as reliable partners with shared democratic values and commitment to the rule of law. The Czech Republic, for instance, has developed a national Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the Chinese market by diversifying its economic ties with other partners, including Taiwan.

Indeed, Taiwan has found vocal allies in the CEE region, with the Czech Senate President Vystrčil’s high-profile visit to Taiwan in 2020 exemplifying these deepening ties. Most recently, Taiwan’s major semiconductor company – TSMC – has begun constructing a semiconductor production facility in Germany, with the Czech Republic and other Visegrád Four (V4) states expected to play vital roles as component suppliers.

Meanwhile, Japan has established a regional cooperation platform with the V4 states, while South Korean companies have made significant investments in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. In 2024, the Czech government selected South Korean company KHNP over France’s EDF to build new nuclear reactors at the Dukovany power plant.

Similar developments can be observed at the EU level. While China has leveraged economic interdependence to shape political stances in member states such as Germany and Spain, the EU’s partnerships with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan offer more balanced relationships focused on mutual technological advancements. The 2018 Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan exemplifies the EU’s commitment to fostering deeper ties with democratic Asian economies. Similarly, South Korea has become an important partner in technological development, while Taiwan, despite being only the EU’s 13th largest trade partner, holds strategic importance due to its semiconductor industry.

Ukraine and Taiwan: Parallels and Divergences

Ukraine and Taiwan share several concerning similarities. Both face revisionist powers that contest their sovereignty based on distorted historical narratives. The long-held neoliberal assumption that economic interdependence deters military aggression has proven flawed in Ukraine and may similarly fail when it comes to Taiwan, where the global economic consequences would be even more severe.

Taiwan’s dominant position in semiconductor manufacturing means that disruptions could cost the global economy trillions of dollars, triggering an unprecedented economic crisis. Recognizing this risk, both the EU and Japan have taken steps to enhance their resilience. The EU has sought to mitigate potential damage through initiatives like the European Chips Act, allocating €43 billion to diversify its semiconductor supply chains while reducing reliance on Asian imports. Japanese companies are also taking the threat seriously, actively developing contingency plans for a potential Taiwan Strait crisis.

Despite these similarities, Taiwan also faces unique challenges. Its physical separation from mainland China via the Taiwan Strait provides protection but also increases vulnerability to economic isolation through a blockade. A blockade could cripple Taiwan’s economy and access to critical resources while testing the resolve of the international community without requiring immediate military confrontation between the United States and China.

A key difference between Ukraine and Taiwan, however, lies in their internal resilience. While Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resolve in its national resistance, several surveys suggest that approximately one-third of Taiwanese would prefer surrender over armed resistance, reflecting a less unified consensus on national defense. This further underscores the need to strengthen civil-military cooperation and societal resilience in Taiwan.

Lessons from Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served as a watershed moment for global security, offering valuable insights for Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific. The war has highlighted the global ramifications of regional conflicts, the fragility of international norms, and the critical importance of robust alliances. At least five key lessons emerge from this conflict:

1. 1. Deterrence matters: The greater the investment in conflict prevention, including robust and visible defense preparations, the less likely the actual aggression. While Taiwan benefits from explicit US security guarantees, Ukraine had lacked such assurances prior to 2022.
2. 2. Time is crucial: Delayed action increases vulnerability, with early provision of military support being critical. Western reluctance to provide advanced military equipment to Ukraine early on emboldened Russia and raised the eventual costs of intervention.
3. 3. Sanctions alone don’t deter: Economic measures and international pressure raise costs but rarely prevent determined authoritarian regimes from pursuing strategic goals. Russia underestimated the coordinated Western response but proceeded, nonetheless.
4. 4. Democratic legitimacy and leadership enhance resilience: President Zelenskyy’s leadership has been vital in sustaining morale and securing international support. Taiwan can draw inspiration from Kyiv’s effective communication strategy.
5. 5. Don’t underestimate the authoritarian logic: Leaders like Putin and Xi operate according to different strategic calculations, often prioritizing ideological goals over economic considerations. Understanding the historical, ideological, and cultural drivers of their decision-making is thus essential.

The Way Forward

To address these interconnected challenges, the Czech Republic and its Western allies should:

1. 1. Strengthen cybersecurity and resilience: The Czech Republic can play a leading role in advancing cybersecurity collaboration with Japan, leveraging its expertise and experience in countering both Russian and Chinese cyber operations.
2. 2. Diversify trade to reduce reliance on China: While maintaining necessary economic engagement, the EU must continue its trade diversification, near-shoring, and friend-shoring strategies.
3. 3. Bolster NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific: The Alliance should deepen engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners (IP4) – i.e., Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand – to address shared security challenges. This could also provide further framework for transatlantic cooperation on hybrid threats.
4. 4. Foster EU-wide cohesion: The Czech Republic, together with Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states, should promote collaboration and unity within both NATO and the EU, applying lessons from Ukraine to enhance collective security and resilience.

The interlinked nature of today’s global challenges demands coordinated responses across regions. Recognizing the links between crises in CEE and the Indo-Pacific would allow Western democracies to develop more effective strategies to counter authoritarian revisionism and uphold a stable international order based on shared values and mutual respect.