Europe at a Crossroads: Navigating the US, China, and Russia in an Uncertain World

Europe is at a crossroads. The German federal election may have provided some semblance of political stability with the mainstream conservatives’ victory, but the far-right’s 21 percent share of the vote reveals a deeper challenge. This trend is not unique to Germany but reflects the broader rise of populism across Europe, signaling a shift in voter sentiment that cannot be ignored. Meanwhile, the geopolitical landscape is itself shifting: the new Trump administration is redefining US foreign policy, while China and Russia are capitalizing on the West’s divisions.

If Europe is to navigate these uncertain waters, it must pursue its own strategic interests rather than merely react to Washington’s whims. However, action alone is not enough; real change requires long-term commitment. Europe must stay the course for years to come, consistently implementing policies that reinforce its strategic autonomy, democratic resilience, and economic strength.

The Death of the “West”

The notion of a collective “West” is an illusion of the past. Once a pragmatic Cold War construct held together by a shared fear of communism and US leadership, it now faces fragmentation as American priorities shift and European interests diverge. Washington’s pivot to great power competition, its quasi-isolationist Monroe Doctrine 2.0, and its wavering NATO commitments have left Europe exposed. Adding to this uncertainty, recent remarks from the Trump administration on the origins of the war in Ukraine have deepened doubts about whether Europe and the US still share the same fundamental values.

If Europe can no longer fully rely on US security guarantees, it faces two stark choices: appease Russia on Ukraine – in a manner reminiscent of the 1938 Munich Agreement – or prepare for a NATO without the United States. The first option is tempting but disastrous, handing Moscow a strategic victory and emboldening autocrats worldwide. Yet even if Europe rearms, reintroduces conscription, and takes on debt to fund its military, it will still need US support during the transition – support that may not materialize. The second option, though daunting, appears to be the only sustainable path. It would require bold leadership from the Weimar Triangle (we should not forget Poland), France stepping up as a nuclear deterrent, and the UK remaining a firm part of the European security framework. Canada and the Indo-Pacific allies must also play a role – not to drag Europe into war in Asia, but to keep Russia in check by opening new fronts of pressure.

Europe must also confront an uncomfortable truth: threats to its democracy no longer come solely from Moscow and Beijing. Elon Musk’s dismissive stance on disinformation, Vice-President J.D. Vance’s attacks on freedom of speech in Europe at the Munich Security Conference, and American support for far-right movements in Europe all pose significant risks. If European leaders wish to counter the rise of extremists, they must deny them their political rallying points. Environmental sustainability will not collapse overnight without the Green/Clean Deal but eliminating it would neutralize a major populist talking point. Likewise, closing borders would deprive extremists of their primary mobilization tool. The EU must not surrender key issues to populists. Instead, it must own them, shape them, and use them to its advantage.

China and Russia: A United Front Against Europe

Meanwhile, a dangerous illusion is taking root in some European capitals: that Trump’s hostility toward Europe might make China a more reliable partner. While this argument may seem logical from a theoretical standpoint, it ignores China’s foreign policy objectives. Beijing does not see Europe as an equal. It views the EU as an economic powerhouse but a political and security lightweight. Any attempt to court China will only reinforce this perception of weakness. Moreover, the notion that closer ties with Beijing could lead to Chinese assistance in countering Russia is a strategic delusion. European actions are unlikely to drive a wedge between Russia and China, as their partnership is built on shared ideology and a vision of a multipolar world that dismantles Western influence. Since at least 2015, China has been coordinating influence operations with Moscow to manipulate European public opinion, finance political parties, and interfere in elections.

As Russia continues its war in Ukraine, China remains its most decisive enabler – diplomatically, economically, and technologically. Europe cannot afford to treat Beijing as a neutral or normal partner while it actively undermines European security interests. Yet, a flawed approach persists, viewing Russia and China as two separate challenges to be dealt with independently. This division plays into Beijing and Moscow’s hands, reinforcing a geopolitical reality in which Europe remains strategically reactive rather than proactive.

At the core of Europe’s vulnerability are three major dependencies: reliance on Russian energy, dependence on the Chinese market, and the need for US military protection. We have already seen where dependencies can lead in the cases of Russian energy and American security guarantees – both of which proved unreliable in moments of crisis.

A More Assertive and Unified Europe as the Only Option

The lesson is clear: survival requires breaking free from these vulnerabilities, not replacing one dependency with another. Reducing reliance on the Chinese market, investing in European defense capabilities, and securing diversified energy supplies are no longer strategic options – they are necessities. Only by shedding these structural weaknesses can Europe position itself as a true geopolitical actor rather than a passive battleground for great power competition.

If Europe wants to be taken seriously, it must stop reinforcing China’s narrative of European vulnerability. It must accelerate economic derisking – not as a nod to Washington, but as a strategic necessity. It must expose Chinese influence operations with the same intensity as Russian ones and push back against Beijing’s efforts to divide the continent.

Europe’s China policy should not be driven by the United States, which does not mean it should be softer. Quite the opposite. Europe’s strategic interests demand a firmer, more self-assured approach. Europe still has a window to act, but it must do so decisively. It must rediscover its survival instinct, develop real strategic muscle, try to coordinate coalitions of countries willing to take bold actions, and remove regulations that weaken its economic and military resilience. Above all, Europe must preserve its unity at all costs. The alternative is unthinkable: a Europe that dithers while the world moves on without it.