Caught in Contradiction: China’s Uneasy Role in the CRINK Alliance

China faces a complex diplomatic landscape as it balances strategic partnerships that could undermine its international image. As a key player in the so-called CRINK bloc – i.e., China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – Beijing risks entanglement in multiple international conflicts, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the intensifying hostilities between Israel and Iran.

This involvement directly contradicts China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), an international policing framework through which China’s leader, President Xi Jinping, seeks to position China as a diplomatic fulcrum, promoting peace and stability worldwide. This paradox reveals Beijing’s dilemma: can China maintain its self-proclaimed mediator role while aligning itself with states involved in ongoing conflicts?

As these partnerships become more of a liability than an asset, Beijing appears to be approaching a strategic crossroads. Will China recalibrate its relationships with these conflict-prone nations to preserve its diplomatic credibility, or will its aspirations as a global mediator be jeopardized by its ties to states that fuel regional destabilization?

North Korea’s Role in the Ukraine War

The deployment of North Korean soldiers to support the Russian war in Ukraine has sparked global concerns. While the US has turned to China to intervene and prevent further troop deployments by North Korea, the actions of Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin could complicate Beijing’s regional and international influence.

As Zhu Feng of Nanjing University points out, China faces a “genuine dilemma” between preventing the intensification of the US-Japan-South Korea alliance and avoiding deeper entanglement in the militaristic goals of its CRINK partners. The Chinese foreign ministry has chosen to sidestep the issue in public statements. On November 1, China claimed it knew little about the specifics of Russia-North Korea cooperation, reiterating its support for peace in Ukraine. This rhetoric mirrors China’s past positions: it did not directly endorse Russia’s former Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu’s 2023 plans for a trilateral military alliance between Russia, China and North Korea, nor did it amplify the pro-Kremlin narrative that frames the Russia-North Korea axis as a strategic counterweight to NATO and AUKUS.

Yet, tighter Russian-North Korean cooperation benefits China. It ensures North Korea has an additional patron, which helps preserve the stability of its regime. As RUSI Fellow Samuel Ramani highlights, “China has also leveraged Russia’s diplomatic clout to get Tumen River access, which could tie the Sea of Japan to the Polar Silk Road. North Korea opposed Tumen access historically, and all China had to do for this was store Russia-bound North Korean arms in Zhejiang port.”

Nevertheless, complications keep arising. The influx of $1 billion in hard currency from artillery sales and additional hundreds of millions from remittances tied to North Korean troop deployments could reduce Pyongyang’s economic reliance on China – a crucial lever Beijing has traditionally used through calibrated adjustments in sanctions enforcement. Sustaining this influence may prove increasingly challenging under present conditions. Moreover, China remains cautious about fully endorsing Russia’s stance on North Korea’s nuclear deterrent or the removal of UN sanctions. While Beijing is amenable to satellite development projects, any Russian support for North Korea’s nuclear or ICBM capabilities could emerge as a major point of contention.

Additionally, South Korea might use this situation to bolster its alliances with the West by supplying munitions to Ukraine, which could complicate China’s diplomatic outreach to Seoul, particularly within the recently revitalized China-Japan-ROK trilateral dialogue framework. This could be further strained if South Korea begins to perceive China as complicit in North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia. Accusations of tacit Chinese complicity may well escalate if Beijing continues to resist US calls to apply pressure on both Moscow and Pyongyang – demands it previously opposed when countering Iranian and Houthi assertiveness in the Red Sea.

For now, China does not see this development as an immediate threat to its interests, but neither is supportive of it. Much will depend on the longevity and scope of North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine and Pyongyang’s ability to play Russia and China off against each other.

China and Iran: Balancing Strategic Support with Diplomatic Ambiguity

In the Middle East, China’s relationship with Iran is similarly complex. Beijing has long championed Iran’s sovereignty, most recently condemning Israeli actions as threats to regional peace – whether in Lebanon, Gaza or in the case of Israel’s direct raids against Iran. While this stance fits into China’s broader anti-Western narrative, there are signs that Beijing is growing more reserved in its public support of Iran. Chinese scholars like Ma Xiaolin have criticized Iran’s refusal to adapt to changing regional dynamics, calling Tehran’s approach to Israel “outdated.” Such critiques suggest that Beijing is at least wary of appearing too closely aligned with Iran’s combative stance.

Strategically, China benefits from Iran’s role as a counterbalance to US influence in the Middle East. However, Beijing’s primary aim in the region is not to replace the US but to limit its influence. While China’s Middle East policy is beginning to shift from its traditional stance of “hedging” to “wedging”, Iran’s internal dynamics complicate China’s ambitions as a neutral mediator, especially among nations in the Global South, where China promotes itself as an alternative to Western influence. China’s challenge, then, lies in supporting Iran without aligning too closely with its anti-Israel rhetoric and actions or risk losing credibility in its attempted peace negotiations.

Diplomatic Vision vs. Military Reality

China’s engagement with its CRINK partners starkly contrasts with the diplomatic objectives outlined in its Global Security Initiative, which emphasizes peaceful coexistence. Beijing’s alignment with states involved in prolonged conflicts thereby risks undermining its narrative as a global mediator committed to peace.

The risks of aligning too closely with military actions are becoming evident. North Korea’s support for Russia could deepen US-Japan-South Korea cooperation, eroding China’s influence within ASEAN and other Indo-Pacific countries. Similarly, Beijing’s support for Iran risks alienating Arab states that are moving toward normalized relations with Israel, thus undermining one of its greatest mediation success stories – the Saudi-Iran normalization.

The speculation that China and Russia may be orchestrating these multiple conflicts to stretch US resources – the so-called “DragonBear” strategy – further complicates China’s position. A coordinated approach to confront Western powers, even if speculative, would be grounded in a strategic logic: by exacerbating tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East, and East Asia, Beijing and Moscow could strain American military and diplomatic capacities, particularly in light of the internal US political divisions. However, the West’s framing of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran as an “axis of upheaval” would run counter to China’s ambitions as a stabilizing force.

An Increasingly Unsustainable Balance

The alternative view suggests that China might tolerate these destabilizing alliances to weaken Western influence indirectly by fostering instability. As appealing as this might be, it could also generate backlash if it undermines China’s long-term objectives, particularly its ambitions for economic integration and influence across the Global South.

China’s balancing act between its CRINK partnerships and its self-proclaimed diplomatic principles is becoming increasingly untenable. While Beijing’s partnerships with North Korea, Iran, and Russia may have once provided clear benefits, the globalized nature of contemporary conflicts has turned them into liabilities. Ultimately, China’s standing as a global mediating power may hinge on its ability to navigate these partnerships without compromising its commitment to diplomacy and peace.