Less Controllable Bodies: How China’s New Population Growth Policy is Failing

One of China’s biggest challenges today is its unprecedented low birth rate that threatens its economic development, especially given the country’s unsustainable pension system that is expected to be financially unviable by 2035. Besides this, the system shows wide discrepancies between northern and southern Chinese regions, which stems from their different economic development models. And while Chinese authorities continue to adopt and implement multiple policies aimed at boosting marriage and birth rates, Chinese citizens are increasingly disengaging from the party-state.   

A Propaganda Machine Stuck in the Past 

By all standards, China is a surveillance state that uses social credit, face recognition AI and other means to control its own population. From 1980 to 2015, Beijing successfully imposed its infamous One-Child Policy that led to effective population control. This was deemed necessary to address the lack of capital, energy and consumer goods the country faced as it had not yet fully engaged in its market-economy reforms. Indeed, the combination of strict birth control and economic opening-up did lead to a dramatic improvement in living standards. At the same time, Beijing showed that it would stop at nothing to enforce its coercive measures that included hefty fines in rural areas, forced abortions at late stages, and even forced sterilization. The One-Child Policy also resulted in an alarming gender gap, with over 30 million women gone missing, which has led to large-scale trafficking from other Asian countries.

Today, the challenge is the opposite of the situation in the early 1980s: China needs more children. China’s birth rate hit its lowest in 2023, with 6.2 children per 1,000 inhabitants, nearing the figures in Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, longevity is on a sharp rise, estimated to reach 81 years in 2035, compared to under 70 in the 1990s. The result of these demographic trends is concerning: there are fewer people able to support a growing population of retirees who live much longer. This means domestic consumption will further decrease, and there will be even fewer young families with children.

As the Chinese economy continues showing alarming signs of stagnation, the government has launched several measures aimed at encouraging dating, marriage, and multiple births. In 2021, it announced a Three-Children Policy, alongside a package of financial and social benefits. Continuing with its old methods, the state even surveils women’s sexual and reproductive health, while organizing mass dating events for singles. However, none of these efforts seem to work: the fertility rate for 2024 is estimated at 1.7, well below the minimum replacement rate of 2.1.

The Crumbling Social Contract in China

Until recently, the country’s GDP growth was the basis of the social contract between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the majority of Chinese citizens, meaning that every generation – starting from the 1980s – was guaranteed to live better than the previous one. By providing wealth, Beijing could easily brush aside any domestic criticism and justify its regular use of state violence and censorship.

But this contract no longer holds, with a conservative estimate putting youth unemployment at right under 20%. University graduates often work as delivery drivers, and a foreign degree no longer guarantees a comfortable job, which after decades of almost guaranteed prestigious employment, comes as a shock to many families. The real estate sector – once the prime destination for family savings that was considered the best investment for the future – is facing a major crisis, leaving citizens with mortgaged houses that are not built by companies that go bankrupt and vanish. Moreover, the devastating zero-COVID policy imposed from 2020 until the end of 2022 has decimated small- and medium-sized businesses, which have yet to recover.

Overall, the ‘meiyou anquan gan’ syndrome – the feeling of not being safe in any area of life – has only increased among Chinese people. Those with enough connections and money consider moving abroad, and people from all walks of life rely on personal solutions, becoming increasingly cynical about any government policies claiming to support them while only revealing how disconnected the elites in ‘Zhongnanhai’ are from the daily realities. 

Redefined Womanhood: A Direct Challenge to the Party

Although China built its revolution in 1949 on class and gender equality, and managed to change deeply rooted social stereotypes, the CCP has embraced patriarchal views by recycling Confucian models of femininity and family under its socialist banner. Tellingly, the current Politburo does not include a single woman, which is a first in 20 years.

There is also a growing gap in the perception of women’s roles between the state and society, which is due to a combination of several economic, social and identity factors. A 2024 report found that the cost of raising a child in China is among the highest in the world. Besides, a good education no longer guarantees a middle-class job, and more women prioritize their independence through work and financial stability, challenging the traditional ‘marriage-childbirth-housewife’ model.

Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, comes from the emergence of a feminist discourse that, despite the ongoing attempts by the government to intervene by labeling it a ‘dangerous ideology’, is here to stay. Indeed the #MeToo movement, which gained public attention around 2014 in China, demonstrated that male abuse of power and sexual misconduct could be publicly discussed and challenged. And even though very few legal cases were brought forward – with even less resulting in any accountability for the men involved – a new model of gender relations embedded in Chinese reality has, nevertheless, emerged as a point of reference. This is evidenced by the relentless harassment, arrests, and imprisonments of feminist activists by the authorities unwilling to tolerate any dissent.

If Beijing wants its policies aimed at reversing the falling birth rates to succeed, it may need to consider including independent women’s voices. This is precisely what many social media posts that make comparisons between the domestic situation and similar issues in Japan and Taiwan, call for. More importantly, these examples from Northeast Asia suggest that falling birth rates are irreversible, requiring societies to adapt to entirely new economic and social models of development, some of which may include easing restrictions on foreign migrants.

Faced with a record low birth rate, Beijing finds itself caught in its own narrative. As suggested by a Global Times article: “China regards the people’s right to subsistence and development as its top priority.” However, the Chinese people are long past the level of ‘subsistence’ this refers to, and the people are now seeking security amid a crumbling system. And while it is too early to talk about a ‘parallel’ society that exists outside the system in China, the society’s refusal to comply with state policies that are essential to the party’s survival is already an indication of a larger crack in the system.