Why Poland Is World’s Leading Buyer of Taiwanese Drones

This year, Poland has quietly become the world’s biggest buyer of Taiwanese drones, taking in nearly 60 percent of Taiwan’s total exports. Taiwan and Poland also signed a memorandum of understanding on building non-China supply chains in the drone industry this week. But is it just a short-term procurement spike, or one of the first signs of a deeper realignment in how Europe thinks about security and defense? Poland’s drone purchases shed light on how the country navigates its remilitarization at a time when Russia grows more aggressive, skepticism toward China and its technologies is growing, and Europe’s own defense industry, despite clear efforts, still struggles to meet the rising demand.

Poland’s procurement choices appear driven less by politics or ideology than by pragmatic considerations. As the war in Ukraine continues to shape defense planning across the EU, unmanned systems have become essential for surveillance, reconnaissance, and other military operations. Countries, especially the ones on the EU’s and NATO’s eastern flank, like Poland, are therefore looking for suppliers who can deliver reliable drones quickly, at scale, and without major political complications.

Speed, Scale, and Trust

Taiwanese manufacturers have gained a reputation for producing drones that meet several of these needs. Their systems tend to be relatively affordable, resilient, and increasingly tested in challenging environments. Their use by the Ukrainians has also contributed to the credibility of Taiwanese equipment among European militaries that closely follow the war.

Like many European states, Poland to an extent relies on Chinese supply chains and imports a variety of industrial and manufacturing goods. But growing concerns about China, and the vision of being hit with export restrictions during moments of peak geopolitical tensions have pushed the Polish government to look for alternatives. European producers build technologically advanced systems, but they are not yet able to provide the sheer quantities demanded by today’s military scaling. American drones remain crucial, but their acquisition can sometimes be slowed by costs or regulations, a thorny problem that has started being tackled only recently.

Taiwan fits perfectly into the middle ground: accessible, reliable, and politically less complicated for EU governments seeking to reduce their dependence on Chinese technologies. For Poland, which prioritizes effectiveness and rapid delivery, this combination made Taiwanese drones a practical and desired solution.

Reassessed Dependence on Chinese Technology

Although Poland stands out in terms of import volumes of Taiwanese drones, it is not the only country in the region reassessing its dependence on Chinese technologies. In spite of some recent political changes in Lithuania or Czechia, Central and Eastern European (CEE) states have generally taken steps to limit the use of Chinese equipment and technology in critical sectors.

In this sense, Poland’s interest in Taiwanese drones may reflect a broader regional tendency. Traditionally, CEE states have perceived primarily Russia through the lens of national security. However, over the past few years, and given Beijing’s ambivalent stance vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine, a similar logic has begun to shape their approach to China as well. This emerging trend at times differs from the perspectives of Western European governments, most recently France, who continue to put greater emphasis on market access, trade, and investments. On the EU level, this divergence continues to influence the debates on China and provides a useful context for interpreting Poland’s and CEE’s vision and understanding of security as an evergreen struggle for physical safety, primarily vis-à-vis Moscow, but also, by proxy, in relation to Beijing as well.

More broadly, Poland’s increasing reliance on Taiwanese drones production also testifies to Europe’s broader challenge in building sufficient defense-industrial capacity. European companies excel in producing sophisticated equipment, but the war in Ukraine has created a significant demand for simple, expendable drones that can be sent out in large numbers. If countries like Poland are turning to Taiwan because European production cannot yet meet the demand, this must prompt further discussion about investments in the defense industrial base and the resilience of supply chains. References to ‘strategic autonomy’ may speak of certain ambitions, but the actual production capacity is what matters on the battlefield. Whether the EU and its member states can address this gap effectively by supporting European manufacturers and the domestic defense ecosystem will likely shape procurement decisions in the coming years, especially in light of the recently released US National Security Strategy 2025, which explicitly calls on Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defense.

Gains and Risks for Taiwan

For Taiwan, Poland’s procurement choices offer potential opportunities. Supplying large quantities of drones to a crucial member of NATO’s eastern flank gives Taiwanese companies visibility and demonstrates that Taiwan can contribute to European security in ways that go beyond semiconductors. Such a cooperation also allows Taiwan to build practical bilateral ties with EU member states, independently of formal diplomatic channels at the EU level. It also helps to create an image of Taiwan willing to help Europe fend off its aggressive neighbor. This may, in theory, make Europe more willing to consider helping Taiwan resist China’s military ambitions, should such a necessity occur – a desire openly expressed by Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s Minister of Defense.

Nonetheless, Taiwan understands well that it must navigate these relationships carefully. Any level of EU-Taiwan cooperation, especially defense-related, even when limited, can attract China’s political attention and further fuel already existing narratives and disinformation. Although Beijing has not officially commented on Poland’s growing drone imports from Taiwan, the development may still be monitored with interest. It is difficult to assess how seriously China takes such transactions, as they could be viewed as simply too technical or limited in visibility and volume to prompt a strong response. Poland is also not among China’s most significant economic partners, which limits Beijing’s leverage and interest.

However, if imports were to grow even more or encourage similar choices broadly in Europe, China might interpret this trend as a gradual strengthening of Taiwan’s informal ties with EU member states. Whether this becomes a point of sensitivity for China will likely depend on how the situation evolves and whether other European countries would indeed follow a similar path.

A Development Worth Observing

It is difficult to know at this stage whether Poland’s emergence as Taiwan’s top drone importer represents a long-term structural shift or simply a response to immediate security concerns. Taking into account the ongoing efforts in the EU to make defense procurement more flexible and adaptive during periods of uncertainty, trends that appear significant may later prove temporary.

Still, this development sheds light on several broader issues. It offers insight into how CEE countries are reassessing their technological and security dependencies. It also suggests that Taiwan is finding practical, relatively low-profile, forms of engagement with Europe, and highlights that certain EU member states are willing to explore such avenues of cooperation. This creates an opportunity for Taiwan to strengthen its ties with Europe and make itself more indispensable for its partners, especially in the context of EU’s ongoing ‘de-risking’ from China. Finally, it highlights gaps in Europe’s own defense-industrial capabilities and shows the direction of choices certain governments may make when domestic supply becomes limited.

Rather than signaling a major transformation in Europe’s general approach to China or Taiwan, Poland’s drone imports may illustrate how, in today’s era of uncertainty, practical needs frequently intersect with larger geopolitical dilemmas. As these security-driven dynamics continue to unfold, they might require closer observation as they may, in a medium-long term, become one of the bricks building the new foundations of European security and defense architecture.