The Porcupine Strategy: Taiwan’s Road to Self-Defense

The rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Xi Jinping has significant implications for Taiwan’s ability to defend itself using purely conventional means of warfare. As such, the question of how to re-establish deterrence and adopt a strategy that would allow Taiwan to defend itself – at least from an initial attack – has become a centerpiece of international discussions.

Drawing from lessons learned during the Japanese invasion of the late 1800s, discussions surrounding asymmetric defense have resurfaced within Taiwan’s political establishment. The concept of asymmetric warfare – also called the ‘porcupine strategy’ – builds on the idea of achieving deterrence by denial, making it costly for China to launch an invasion in the first place. Moreover, even if deterrence fails, asymmetric defense is said to provide Taiwan with better chances to withstand a fight in its littoral areas, with the war in Ukraine further highlighting the benefits of asymmetric defense when engaging with a militarily superior power.

However, while the political establishment under President Lai Ching-te seems keen on boosting Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities, the strategy is still viewed with skepticism within the island’s armed forces. To bring about the long-overdue and comprehensive reform of Taiwan’s military, one of Lai’s core tasks will be to navigate the complex internal dynamics while advocating for paradigm and cultural shifts within the country’s armed forces. Moreover, as a potential Chinese invasion would significantly disrupt global supply chains –especially (but not exclusively) those related to semiconductors – the discussions around the idea of Taiwan’s ‘silicon shield’ have re-emerged as well, with potential implications for the EU’s (and CEE’s) semiconductor ambitions.

Growing Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

As Beijing has been improving its military capabilities, it has also increased its pressure on Taiwan. Just a few weeks before Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2024, Xi referred to the reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as “historically inevitable.” However, the drivers behind the current urgency to upgrade Taiwan’s self-defense are not only China’s assertive rhetoric but also the growing number and frequency of the PLA incursions into Taiwan’s sea and airspace.

Indeed, China’s military drills around the island and intrusions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which have increased significantly since both 2020 and 2022, have become even more prominent under Lai, whom Beijing views as a “separatist.” Unsurprisingly, Beijing responded to Lai’s inauguration with large-scale military drills just three days after he assumed office. Following the incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ by 66 Chinese military aircrafts in July and a large-scale amphibious landing exercise in Fujian’s Dacheng Bay in September, the most recent incursions occurred after Taiwan’s National Day celebrations. The deployment of 153 aircrafts, 28 of which were reported to have crossed the median line as part of China’s Joint Sword military drills on October 14, marked a new daily record, albeit without a missile launch similar to China’s response to Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022.

This is significant, as the growing number and frequency of China’s military drills are making it difficult to detect and differentiate between early signs of invasion preparations and routine exercises. As a result, it is becoming increasingly challenging for Taiwan to prepare its forces and effectively respond to a sudden attack.

An Overdue Reform

Taiwan has long been criticized by foreign observers for not investing enough in reforming its deteriorating military capabilities, making poor organizational choices, and failing to improve the quality of both its active-duty and reservist forces.

Since the former President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in 2016, she has overhauled Taiwan’s traditional approach to defense by increasing defense spending, which now amounts to almost double what it was prior to her tenure; reinstating the island’s one-year compulsory military conscription; increasing pay and unveiling a new curriculum for conscripts. Moreover, it was under Tsai that the former Chief of the General Staff of Taiwan’s Armed Forces, Admiral Lee Hsi-min, advanced an asymmetry-based approach dubbed the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which was endorsed by US defense circles, though it did not survive Lee’s tenure.

Indeed, the failure to maintain the ODC is demonstrative of the key issue: rigid and conservative thinking within Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Their preference for conventional means of warfare, such as big-ticket items like fighter jets, submarines, and large warships, along with highly centralized command structures, have created significant barriers to reforming Taiwan’s military by adopting a more innovative, asymmetric, and layered defense based on acquiring larger quantities of smaller, more agile, and survivable military equipment. As a consequence, once Lee retired, more resources were channeled toward traditional platforms and several asymmetric programs canceled.

Understanding the Asymmetry

Besides institutional culture, several analysts have pointed out differing threat perceptions between Taiwan and the US, which may further explain some of the MND’s long-standing hesitancy about asymmetric defense. While the US defense establishment has focused predominantly on the threat of a full-scale invasion, defense circles in Taiwan have long emphasized the threats associated with a potential blockade and China’s grey-zone activities. These perceptions are, however, changing. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Palestine are influencing these shifts, as seen in Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim’s references to lessons from Ukraine during her speech at a Chatham House conference.

Lai has himself emphasized building Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities, including further strengthening the island’s civil defense, while addressing structural issues such as the armed forces’ nationalist legacy, which is behind ongoing frictions between Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the military. Another sign of a move toward asymmetry came during the annual Hang Kuang exercises in July, which (for the first time) saw actual battlefield training replacing scripted and rehearsed performances. The focus on the adaptability of small units and their tactical and operational decision-making was praised as a sign of Taiwan taking its defense seriously, especially given the long-standing criticism of its military’s hierarchical and centralized structures.

Lai also appointed Wellington Koo as his Minister of Defense. As Taiwan’s first civilian defense minister, Koo has already unveiled several policies signaling a greater shift toward asymmetry. One widely discussed aspect is urban warfare, which leverages Taiwan’s topography and the high population density of its urban areas, both of which are believed to increase Taiwan’s chances of holding off China’s takeover until the arrival of the US and other allies.

The new administration has further emphasized high-tech investments in drones, surface-to-air missiles, and land-based anti-ship missiles, rather than pouring money into large warships and aircraft. This is important not only in light of criticism of Tsai’s indigenous submarine program and continued purchases of conventional weaponry during her tenure, but also given Taiwan’s history of under-investment in its defense sector. In this way, the porcupine strategy presents a more affordable option, reducing pressure on Taiwan’s government to further increase defense spending.

At the same time, it is important to note that Taiwan has already taken several steps in this direction. Particularly noteworthy is Taiwan’s introduction of several indigenous military drones in 2023, equipped with combat or surveillance capabilities that can be used across different military divisions. Taiwan has also produced air and sea defense missiles, small missile corvettes, and mine-laying ships.

Semiconductors and National Security

While the increasing tech cooperation between Taiwan and the EU, including its CEE member states like Czechia, involves discussions about potential arms deals and R&D cooperation in critical technology (including drones), there are also significant economic reasons as to why the EU and CEE should be interested in Taiwan’s defense.

Considering Taiwan’s leading role in global semiconductor production and the EU’s own ambitions in this area, it is crucial not to underestimate the global economic implications of a Taiwan Strait contingency, which would significantly affect the EU’s pursuit of economic security and strategic autonomy. Semiconductors are essential for defense systems and military applications, as well as the EU’s pursuit of digital sovereignty.

Taiwan is aware of its indispensability, as the silicon shield concept suggests. This concept has long been linked to arguments against offshoring Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing. While these concerns are valid, it is also important to understand that the US and EU goals of building their own semiconductor capacities are long-term, and several issues (e.g., labor shortages and infrastructure challenges) are already complicating the establishment of semiconductor clusters outside Taiwan. Taiwan will thus remain an indispensable partner to both the US and the EU for their security (both hard and economic).

Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s continued focus on strengthening its existing semiconductor partnerships with allies, especially those that are most likely to advocate for Taiwan’s interests at different regional and international forums, is the right approach. Indeed, when it comes to Taiwan’s allies in CEE – namely, Czechia, Lithuania, and to a lesser extent, Slovakia and Poland – Taiwan already offers several scholarships that allow students from these countries to study semiconductor-related degrees or participate in summer schools in Taiwan.