The degree of engagement with Taiwan reveals a political divide between Central Europe and the Western Balkans. While many Central European states adhere to the ‘One-China’ Policy, some nevertheless pursue relations with Taiwan, convinced by shared democratic values, economic de-risking from Beijing, and acute security awareness. In the Western Balkans, interactions with Taiwan remain strictly low-key, limited to informal trade and occasional visits due to strict adherence to Beijing’s ‘One-China’ Policy, fueled by Chinese infrastructure investments.
Depending on the viewpoint, Slovenia is either a Central European or a Western Balkan country. Its economy and political culture lean more toward the former, its demography and language more toward the latter, while historically and geographically it is both. Consequently, its Taiwan policy occupies a middle ground, balancing Central European alignments with Western Balkan interests. However, with the recent change in government, questions over a possible policy shift have arisen.
Janez Janša’s History of Support for Taiwan
Prime Minister Janez Janša, who assumed office in June 2026, leads the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS). He has been one of the staunchest supporters of Taiwan among the EU leaders, and his engagement with the island extends back almost three decades. Janša first visited Taiwan as a parliamentarian in 1997 and helped found the Slovenia-Taiwan Friendship Association. Throughout his career, Janša has consistently advocated for Taiwan’s right to self-determination, stating in interviews that if the Taiwanese people choose independence, his government “would support also this position.”
In January 2022, Janša’s government was in negotiations with Taiwan to set up a representative office in Slovenia, criticizing China’s blocking of Taiwan from joining the World Health Organization and presenting it as a country with a one-party system, which is “lecturing about democracy and peace.” At the time, he described Slovenia’s relations with Taiwan as “normal” and added that during the COVID-19 pandemic, he “personally called the health minister of Taiwan” to consult and exchange experiences and that he has “visited Taiwan four or five times so far.”
At the Yushan Forum in Taipei in March 2025, Janša also urged Europe to forge closer relations with Taiwan on all fronts, adding that “Taiwan is increasingly becoming a crucial pillar of peace and stability, not only for the Indo-Pacific region, but the entire world.” The plans to forge closer relations with Taiwan ultimately fell through as Janša’s previous government collapsed in May 2022. However, the idea did not disappear when Janša left office. In March 2025, while still in opposition, he stated that if his party were to regain power, he would oversee an exchange of representatives with Taiwan. Janša’s return to office this year therefore means that an initiative which stalled during his previous government might get a second opportunity to move from advocacy to policy.
Pro-China Government, Pro-Taiwan Opposition?
The previous government of Prime Minister Robert Golob (2022-2026) adopted a more pragmatic China policy, freezing engagement with Taiwan. Its more pro-China stance was also reflected in 2024, when Slovenia voted against the EU tariffs on Chinese EVs, and it was the second Eurozone state (after Portugal) and the first CEE country to issue yuan-denominated ‘panda bonds’ in April 2026. Both moves drew sharp criticism from Janša’s SDS, which alleged that Golob’s government had increased the trade deficit with China and increased the dependence on it.
While SDS was in opposition between 2022 and 2026, its foreign policy agenda regarding Taiwan did not change. Two SDS delegation members had received Taiwanese donations for their constituencies in 2025. Subsequently, a month after coming back to power in June 2026, Janša’s party dispatched a 15-member delegation to Taiwan, which included lawmakers and party officials. The interlocutors discussed possibilities to cooperate across a wide range of fields, including politics, trade, public health, education, and art. While the trip might resemble a courtesy visit or a quid pro quo, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung noted that Taiwan did not invite the delegation; it occurred at Janša’s urging.
While no statements have been issued since, nor has any follow-up high-level official visit been announced, Janša’s political past and the recent delegation indicate that an intensification of Slovenia’s engagement with Taiwan in the near future is not unlikely. In addition, support for Taiwan in Slovenia is broader than for Janša or his party. As Slovenia is a small country, which only won its independence after a short war in 1991, many of its citizens are inclined to support the underdogs in international politics. In a similar vein, Slovenia has been one of the oldest and strongest supporters of Kosovo’s independence, and while the current government supports Israel, around 60 percent of Slovenians supported the recognition of Palestine in 2024. While no public polls have been carried out to gauge Slovenians’ opinions about Taiwan, they see China in a more favorable light than the EU average or other CEE countries, but considerably more negatively compared to people in the Western Balkans.
Business Potential Behind Ideology
Despite Janša’s actions, Slovenia’s foreign policy toward Taiwan is not expected to change on a whim and overnight – and the change would not be due to purely political calculation. If the policy shift happens, it will also be due to economic interests, as Slovenia seeks further cooperation with Taiwan, particularly in the areas of semiconductors, drones, defense technology, and artificial intelligence. Increasing engagement with Taiwan would offer mutual economic and technological benefits. Through mechanisms like the $200 million CEE Investment Fund and targeted academic exchanges, such as the IC Taiwan Grand Challenge, Taiwan can offer Slovenian firms and research institutes direct access to capital, advanced semiconductor IP, and integration into global high-margin supply chains. For Slovenia, however, the opportunity lies not in attracting large-scale semiconductor manufacturing but in engineering and advanced manufacturing niches that can contribute to Taiwan’s technology ecosystem.
Cooperation with Slovenia would also benefit Taiwan’s chipmakers, who need advanced optical and laser components to support next-generation semiconductor packaging. TSMC acknowledges that lasers, testing, and optical assembly represent the immediate physical bottlenecks for co-packaged optics. While Lithuania can provide semiconductor lasers, Slovenia holds world-leading expertise in niche high-precision optomechanics. For instance, Slovenia’s Fotona provides high-durability optomechanics and articulated optical arms. The Jožef Stefan Institute – which already cooperates with Taiwan – specializes in ultrafast spectroscopy and laser-matter interactions. Together, they could provide specialized physical tooling needed to help reduce TSMC bottlenecks while diversifying Taiwan’s supply chains.
By pursuing stronger trade links with Taiwan, Slovenia would be far from a lone wolf in the EU. Taiwanese investment in the EU almost tripled between 2020 and 2024, reaching €14 billion by June 2025. Slovenia can therefore frame increased cooperation with Taiwan as diversification within the EU framework rather than as a unilateral geopolitical realignment or an exception to its China policy.
How Far Can the Government Go?
While a radical foreign policy shift toward the recognition of Taiwan is highly unlikely given North Macedonia’s 1999 experience, allowing the Taiwanese to open a representative office in Slovenia would not be unimaginable despite Lithuania’s 2022 experience. In fact, then-Prime Minister Janez Janša defended Lithuania’s decision. Though the new government has been in power for only three months and its formal foreign policy roadmap regarding China and Taiwan is still taking shape, in the short term, Slovenia might test the waters by incrementally stepping up engagement with Taiwan before taking any steps toward potentially formalizing the relationship.
The most likely near-term strategy is incremental testing of the waters, where Slovenia expands parliamentary exchanges, university cooperation, research links, business contacts, and technology partnerships while remaining within the EU’s ‘One-China’ framework. This would allow Ljubljana to test both sides of the equation: whether cooperation with Taiwan produces the desired economic and technological benefits, and how China responds to the strengthening of Slovenia-Taiwan relations.
Written by
Urban Jakša
Dr. Urban Jakša is a researcher and analyst focusing on conflict, peace, and security in Southeastern and Eastern Europe. He currently heads the European Union Training Initiative (EUTI), which trains staff at EU CSDP civilian crisis management missions. Urban previously worked for the UN, NATO, and OSCE on disarmament, anti-corruption, and election monitoring, respectively. He has a PhD in Politics from the University of York and has held fellowships at Columbia University (Fulbright), UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), European Leadership Network (ELN), and International Republican Institute (IRI).
