Eurasian Pivot in the South Caucasus

China and the South Caucasus countries are increasing their interactions. Reasons vary from enhanced connectivity to the decline of Western influence, and the rise of a Eurasian pivot in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

When it comes to China’s approach to the South Caucasus, ever since the end of the Soviet Union the region has not featured prominently on Beijing’s foreign policy agenda. Recent developments, however, signal a shift in China’s perspective.

In September, China and Georgia signed a memorandum of understanding to advance bilateral trade and regional infrastructure. The same month, another South Caucasus country, Azerbaijan, announced it would join a venture from 2023 aimed at facilitating freer cargo shipments from China to the EU.

These two deals follow a series of larger agreements signed between Beijing and both Tbilisi and Baku in 2023-2024. For instance, China expressed interest in expanding infrastructure projects with Azerbaijan as part of a strategic partnership agreed upon in July 2024. Earlier, in July 2023, Georgia signed a strategic partnership agreement with China, paving the way for another major deal involving a Chinese consortium in the development of a deep-sea port in Anaklia on Georgia’s Black Sea coast. The port project aims to transform Georgia into a critical hub along the Middle Corridor – a trade route linking the EU and Turkey with Central Asia and China.

The Middle Corridor

Greater engagement with Georgia and Azerbaijan signals that for China the South Caucasus is a critical part of the Middle Corridor, which spans from Central Asia to the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Any major project development in the South Caucasus by Beijing is, therefore, contingent on its progress in Central Asia.

China has increased its political engagement in the South Caucasus after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which disrupted Eurasian connectivity. Prior to the war, the primary route linking China with the EU traversed Russia, and this was a constant ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The route was a direct path across the Russian heartland and did not require crossing multiple border controls or seas. In contrast, the Middle Corridor is a multimodal route requiring both land and sea transportation, with several border checks –factors that have historically hindered the corridor’s development as a major transport link.

With the war in Ukraine, the need to diversify the connectivity options in Eurasia has become more pronounced and China has embraced the Middle Corridor as a viable alternative. But it was not only the war in Ukraine, but also the ongoing shipping crisis in the Red Sea that has elevated the strategic importance of the South Caucasus as the shortest geographical link between China and the EU.

Multi-vectorism in the South Caucasus

China’s growing interest in the South Caucasus has coincided with a broader structural shift in Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s foreign policies. With Western influence increasingly contested, both countries are exploring new partnerships to diversify their political and economic options. This pivot signals not just a temporary alignment but a profound strategic reorientation – one that signals the birth and rise of multi-vectoral foreign policies in the region.

In case of Georgia, while the country has expanded its ties with Turkey and signaled a willingness to engage more closely with Iran, it has yet to express interest in joining institutions like the BRICS+ or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In contrast, Azerbaijan has made bigger strides toward integration with the BRICS+, with its application to join the group underscoring its interest in a multipolar approach to international relations, as it seeks to join a coalition that advocates for alternatives to the collective dominance by the West. In addition, Azerbaijan is also enhancing its engagement with the SCO, seeking to elevate its status from dialogue partner to observer.

For both Georgia and Azerbaijan, these shifts are driven by economic and political considerations. China has significant financial resources to invest in crucial infrastructure projects, ranging from ports to railways, which positions both countries as vital nodes in the broader Eurasian trade and energy networks. This pivot reflects a trend toward embracing an “Asian pivot,” where Tbilisi’s and Baku’s foreign policies are no longer centered on any single geopolitical actor but are increasingly oriented toward stronger ties with Eurasian powers.

This reorientation, however, comes at the expense of traditional ties with the West, especially in Georgia’s case. Although Georgia holds EU candidate status, it has recently questioned some of the foundational aspects of its relationships with the EU and NATO. This skepticism has prompted Western calls for a re-evaluation of these partnerships, with both the US and EU reducing their financial support for Georgia, and NATO refraining from reaffirming Georgia’s membership aspirations – a significant shift since the 2008 Bucharest summit.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has never sought NATO or EU membership, while maintaining a stable – albeit transactional – relationship with both the US and the EU. Over the past year, however, tensions have grown, with Baku imposing entry bans on European parliamentarians critical of its stance in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Relations with France have also soured, with Paris accusing Azerbaijan of instigating riots in New Caledonia, a French territory in the Pacific Ocean.

Looking Ahead

The growing reorientation of both Georgia and Azerbaijan goes beyond temporary diplomatic adjustments, suggesting a substantial shift in the balance of power in the South Caucasus. The region is no longer solely a stage for the traditional West-Russia rivalry; it is now a contested zone among multiple global powers, with China being a driving force behind these shifts. The multi-vector trend will likely accelerate with Donald Trump’s return as the US president, as he is expected to shift its foreign policy away from west Asia and the wider Black Sea region in favor of focusing on the Indo-Pacific. This multipolar environment then creates an opportunity for countries like Georgia and Azerbaijan to practice a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing relationships with both Western and non-Western powers.