The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
expanding influence in Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe, has
been the source of increasing global attention and scrutiny. For those who
have been monitoring Sino-Australian relations over the past five years, it rings a familiar bell.
Learning how to respond to Chinese influence has been a testing, and ongoing,
process for the Asia-Pacific nation.

Concerns over Chinese influence in both Australia and
Europe primarily revolve around the fostering of pro-CCP sentiment among
political elites, described by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull as
interference,’ as
well as Chinese (especially state-owned enterprise) investment in critical
infrastructure and strategic industries. This article highlights two noteworthy
areas where Australia has counteracted Chinese influence that can serve as
lessons to Central and
Eastern European countries.

and block Chinese FDI in strategic industries and critical infrastructure

China has been a major contributor of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Australia, investing €24.36bn
in 2016-2017. Nearly half of this investment has come from Chinese SOEs.
Large-scale infrastructure, such as the Port of Melbourne (partial ownership)
or renewable energy company Pacific Hydro, is often the target of Chinese SOE investment.

The CCP has also showed the capability to secure
influence in Central and
Eastern Europe using Chinese FDI. For example, the CCP was
lauded in Hungary when it announced the construction of a €2.1 billion railway line
from Budapest to Belgrade in 2017. 

Elsewhere, Poland was the recipient of Chinese funding for a highway and two power plants.
Meanwhile in the Czech Republic,
CEFC China Energy went on a brief spending spree, purchasing in sectors such
as soccer,
finance and airlines. The
CEFC turned out to be run on a Ponzi scheme and when CEFC chairman Ye Jianming disappeared in China, the
Chinese state-owned
CITIC bailed out the company. The bail-out was proceeded by the personal letter
from Czech President Miloš Zeman, who had appointed Ye Jianming his personal
advisor on China, to Xi Jinping.

The example of CEFC demonstrates why there are global
concerns about FDI by (allegedly)
private Chinese companies as well as SOEs. Tech company Huawei has found
itself at the centre of this global dispute. In Australia, Huawei and fellow
Chinese tech corporation ZTE were denied access to a nation-wide rollout of 5G
infrastructure due to apprehension about their potential susceptibility to the Chinese state’s

This episode accompanied the implementation of
numerous new legal and structural developments by the Australia government over
the past two years to combat an influx of Chinese FDI in ‘critical industries’.

First, the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB),
which is responsible for advising the Treasury about foreign takeovers and serves as the Australia’s primary
screening mechanism, was reinvigorated and began to take a tougher stance on
Chinese investment. The FIRB has also been proactively developing its
understanding of FDI and foreign influence through interaction with U.S. and
U.K. governments.

In 2018, Australia passed the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act,
which targets sabotage, espionage and coercion in the electricity, gas, water
and port industries. The Act was designed to provide a framework for managing
risks to national security relating to these sectors. Specifically, this meant
greater transparency in ownership and operations, and increased channels of
cooperation and collaboration between the government and owners and operators.

In addition, the government introduced the Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms
(TSSR), which obliged all telecommunications carriers and affiliates to improve
their protection of networks and facilities from unauthorized access and
interference. It also reformed the landscape of agricultural investment by
restricting the sale of agricultural land to domestic bidders for the first 30
days before being opened to foreign investors.

The results of this strict approach to FDI have been visible. In 2016 Australia blocked the €6.26bn purchase of energy provider AUSGRID by CCP SOE State Grid Corp and Hong Kong business Cheung Kong Infrastructure, while in 2018 it rejected the €8.6bn proposed acquisition of Australian gas pipeline provider APA Group by the same Hong Kong consortium.

The EU’s proposed Europe-wide framework for screening FDI is
a step in the right direction, as it encourages FDI information sharing for
nations with screening policies. However, it does not provide a real screening
mechanism with the power
to block problematic FDI for each member state. It
leaves the creation and implementation of any screening measures up to the EU member states.
While there has been movement towards screening policies in some countries, e.g. the Czech
Republic,  which is drafting a rather
strong mechanism, there is an absence of the urgency and
extensiveness shown by Australia.

Increase transparency in political relations with
foreign entities

Publicity and concern about Chinese influence in Australia
reached its height in 2016-17 after the discovery that powerful CCP affiliates
in Australia used political donations to establish connections with Australian
political elites. The watershed moment occurred when Labor Senator Sam Dastyari was exposed
for receiving donations to fund personal legal fees by Chinese property developer
and frequent political donator, Huang Xiangmo. Dastyari also gave Huang
counter-intelligence information
and publicly opposed Labor Party policy on the South China Sea Dispute during a
joint press conference with Huang.

From 2012-16 Huang donated at least €1.25m
to numerous Australian politicians on either side of the political aisle. These
included notables such as Trade Minister Andrew Robb and Prime Minister Tony
Abbot. Huang was President of the Australian Council for the Promotion of
Peaceful Reunification of China (ACPPRC), an organization
overseen by the CCP’s
United Front Work Department. The Australian Home Affairs Department has raised
significant concerns over Huang’s CCP links and motivation for advancing CCP interests
in Australia.

China’s cultivation of Central and Eastern European
elites begins with national leaders and has been enhanced by the 16+1 platform. It then
trickles down through economic, political, academic and journalistic circles.
The goal of this influence is the same as in Australia: to try and spread a
pro-China narrative
through society.

Nowhere is this influence more evident than with Czech
President Miloš
Zeman who is one of the most vocal pro-Chinese voices in the Czech Republic.
Zeman was so infatuated by the Chinese that in 2015 he hired then Chairman of
CEFC China Energy Company Ye Jianming to be his special economic advisor on
China. Unsurprisingly, this appointment preceded the aforementioned investment
spree by CEFC in the Czech Republic. Zeman also defended Huawei and publicly rejected a

against the company’s products issued by the Czech National Cyber and
Information Security Authority in late 2018.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has also been publicly cozying up to China in the last few years. As showed by ChinfluenCE research, Orbán and his FIDESZ party used to be fierce China bashers while in opposition; that changed in 2010 with their election victory and announcement of the ‘Eastern Opening’ policy. The debate on China in Hungary then turned one-dimensional and pragmatic, as both right and left wing Hungarian parties silently agree on the importance of China as an economic partner while the issues of human rights and values have almost completely disappeared from the Hungarian parliament’s agenda.

Meanwhile, Australia
has been proactive and vocal in responding to Chinese influence. In 2018 it introduced new
espionage and intelligence laws. Malcom Turnbull stated that these laws were built on “sunlight,
enforcement, deterrence and capability” and targeted “covert, coercive or corrupt” foreign
influence activities. Their aim is to increase transparency in the donation
process by requiring registration of all foreign donations from actors with
foreign government links. Furthermore, the government introduced foreign
interference as a criminal offense, along with 37 other new crimes.

The scope of these laws has since enabled the
government to cancel Mr Huang’s permanent residency and deny his citizenship
request, thereby expelling him from the country.

Central Europe may not have been as popular a target as Australia for direct political influence by the CCP, however the Chinese infatuation by some of the Central and Eastern Europe’s highest officials may indeed be harder to shake than those in Australia. It would be wise for Central and Eastern European countries to use Australia’s model of counter-influence as inspiration to find their own unique strategies to pushback against Chinese influence. Being an Asia-Pacific nation, Australia relies heavily on China for economic stability, yet it still managed to protect its national security interests. With this in mind, claims that economic stimulus from China prevent Central and Eastern European nations from doing the same are unconvincing.

Author Details
Josh Hickman works at the Association for International Affairs (AMO)’s project ChinfluenCE an international project mapping Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Josh studies at the Australian National University where he focuses on the rise of China and its global impact.
Josh Hickman works at the Association for International Affairs (AMO)’s project ChinfluenCE an international project mapping Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Josh studies at the Australian National University where he focuses on the rise of China and its global impact.