Beyond TikTok: The National Security Risks of Chinese Agricultural Drones

This article was originally published by War on the Rocks and is republished here with the permission of the authors.

While Washington fixates on TikTok’s potential to share personal data with Chinese intelligence for disinformation and hybrid warfare, a far more dangerous data-collecting technology is literally flying under the radar: Chinese-made agricultural drones. The threat they pose to national security could be more devastating than any data scrubbed from social media platforms. These non-military drones, now embedded in global markets, go beyond tracking personal data – they collect highly specific agricultural data that could be weaponized to gain unprecedented leverage over critical food production, resources, and supplies.

In response to growing levels of food insecurity driven by climate change and population growth, farmers worldwide are increasingly relying on new technologies that could help China gain a dominant position in the global food market. More radically, agricultural data could be used to unleash biological warfare against crops, annihilating an adversary’s food supply. Such scenarios pose a significant threat to national security, offering China multiple avenues to undermine critical infrastructures by devastating food availability, threatening trade and economic resilience, and destabilizing agricultural systems.

The high level of security vulnerabilities associated with smart agriculture technologies, combined with the current lack of preparedness to address them, makes these technologies a potential target for adversaries. Deficient regulatory oversight increases the threats associated with agroterrorism from both state and non-state actors. Addressing the threats posed by Chinese-made technologies requires interdepartmental and interagency collaboration, as well as international regulatory frameworks to address data privacy concerns related to smart agriculture technologies and prevent their misuse.

In this respect, farmers, national security establishments, and consumers should take a page from the “know your farmer, know your food” campaign and demand to “know your technology, where it comes from, and who has access to your data.” As smart agriculture technology advances, it is crucial to prioritize data security and increase broader security awareness and practices in the agricultural sector. In the current confrontation with China, it is important to recognize that at the heart of such technological innovation is not just geopolitical competition, but also the need to create a more secure global food system.   

Beyond Telecommunications

Democratic capitals – from Washington to Tokyo – are concerned about their reliance on Chinese technologies and its implications for national security. And while much of the focus remains on telecommunications companies and social platforms like TikTok, and their potential misuse of personal data, this narrow scope overlooks broader vulnerabilities that pose far more significant risks.

Technological innovation is the centerpiece of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream,” which aims to transform China into a leading global powerhouse by 2049. In this context, it is crucial to shift the attention away from merely banning Chinese-developed technologies to examining their broader security implications and developing a more meaningful national security policy and rhetoric to address their vulnerabilities. A recent report by the US House of Representatives highlighted the threats posed by Chinese drone technologies in academic research programs, not just for siphoning off raw data, but also as a backdoor to access university IT systems and knowledge repositories.

The securitization of Chinese technologies began with measures against the telecommunications giant Huawei and its involvement in establishing 5G networks. Today, legislators across North America and Europe are deeply concerned about TikTok’s potential misuse of consumer data by its Chinese owner, ByteDance. This data could be shared with Chinese intelligence services and the military, posing a significant security threat. With the House of Representatives passing a bill on March 13 that requires ByteDance to divest its American assets or face a ban, House Republican Steve Scalise stressed that “this is a critical national security issue.” And while this may well be the case, the question remains whether a social media platform owned by a Chinese company is the critical national security concern.

The public and policy attention lavished on TikTok is an attempt to address prospective threats associated with the data gathered by Chinese technologies. Yet, this focus seems to reflect the security theater underpinning much of the current securitization of Chinese technologies – it implements measures that create the illusion of improved security while doing little to achieve it. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could use TikTok data for disinformation or hybrid warfare campaigns, social media-based manipulation is not a new issue, and recent reports show that China has been largely ineffective in such operations. Despite this, there is no discussion of other data-collecting technologies that could threaten national security in far more destructive ways. One such overlooked technology is agricultural drones.

Drone Danger

China is the world leader in the agricultural drone industry, having experienced a drone revolution in agriculture since the late 2010s. Chinese-owned drone manufacturers XAG and DJI are leaders in the smart agriculture industry. These farming-specific drones can spray, feed, and monitor crops with more precision and speed than any human. They are fast-growing and one of the most widely used industry-level drones. Driven by advanced AI and cloud computing, any internet-connected device, such as a smartphone, can control data transfers and collection. These technologies are revolutionizing agricultural practices in response to the need for increased crop yields and viability in the face of climate change and the growing population.

However, the very connected technologies that are changing agricultural operations and improving farming efficiency are posing new qualitative challenges for national and food security. It seems that much of the smart agriculture security debate has focused on cybersecurity and the potential threats posed by malware to hack farming data. Yet, when it comes to agricultural drones, owing to poor regulation, third parties can access the full spectrum of data gathered by these technologies without resorting to illicit means.

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have alerted officials that drones manufactured by DJI can threaten national security. In January, CISA published its cybersecurity guidance report blacklisting drones manufactured by DJI due to the risk of critical infrastructure espionage. At the center of these concerns is China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires all Chinese corporations to cooperate with intelligence services and give them access to data collected both within China and internationally. Indeed, these drones capture high-definition aerial images and real-time recordings that can identify the location of critical infrastructure, but this is not the only concern. A more pressing, yet unaddressed, issue is that these agricultural drones collect comprehensive food production data worldwide, which China could weaponize to exert influence.

As part of their investment strategy, the Chinese government has made military agreements with Chinese-owned agriculture drone manufacturers and agriculture research universities. Their military-civil fusion strategy – integrating civilian technologies with military goals – enables the Chinese government to exploit critical farming data for economic and military advantages. To support sustainable food production by monitoring crop health and predicting crop yields, the drones collect alarmingly specific data about the crops and regions they are used in. For example, a drone used for corn fields in the US, one of the world’s largest corn exporters, will gather detailed information about the area’s climate, soil conditions, and susceptibility to pests and diseases. The onboard AI can analyze this data to report crop vulnerabilities and identify optimum growth conditions for these and other crops, such as rice and wheat – foods on which much of the world’s population depends. From Brazil’s soy farms to Spain’s olive groves, the Chinese government could potentially access farming data from customers in any region.

This data exploitation could facilitate the Chinese government’s efforts to design “perfect” products that farmers will seek out for healthier crops and increased yields. Chinese drone manufacturer XAG has already signed agreements with Bayer and Chinese-owned Syngenta, two of the world’s foremost agricultural science corporations. Farming data shared with these R&D enterprises helps them create precisely what farmers need – fertilizers that optimize crop growth and quality, highly effective pesticides and fungicides, and genetically modified seeds that withstand drought and other extreme conditions. This may not matter now, but it will in the next few decades, as farmers struggle to grow healthy crops and feed the world.

Chinese companies are seeking to become the leading suppliers of smart agricultural technologies, which would help Beijing dominate the global food market. China could use price controls, set export restrictions, and implement trading fees for products affecting crop growth. This would impact other sectors, such as meat and dairy, since crops like corn are used for livestock feed. In addition, China could establish trade agreements with other countries for food products they need, potentially reducing reliance on Western markets. This market influence would strengthen China’s economic power and provide it with significant political leverage. The FBI has already warned about the CCP’s economic espionage efforts and plans to dominate the global market. In this context, smart agriculture drones can become an essential tool in China’s strategic outreach.

Conclusion

While concerns about critical infrastructure espionage tied to Chinese drones are growing, their potential to dominate the food market – and to conduct biological warfare against crops –remains largely overlooked. As the Chinese agricultural technology juggernaut quietly grows, policymakers must act now to safeguard national security. Nations can protect their food security and economic interests by regulating the data collected by agricultural drones, preventing third-party access, and reassessing the broader strategic implications of these technologies. Yet, for now, the data gathered by these drones is far less regulated than the data collected by TikTok. Failure to act could give China a decisive advantage in any prospective future confrontation. Left unchecked, the exploitation of smart agriculture data could leave nations vulnerable to food-based coercion. If this becomes part of China’s asymmetric warfare strategy, they are clearly playing the long game for global dominance.