Belarus-China Relations: Optimism in the Shadows of Asymmetry and Caution

This article is part of a series of articles authored by young, aspiring China scholars under the Future CHOICE initiative.

In a statement congratulating Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on his re-election in January 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed that bilateral relations between their two nations had reached the highest level of an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership.” Meanwhile, speaking ahead of the Belarus presidential election, Lukashenko described the country as Belarus’s future.

On one hand, this grand rhetoric suggests that bilateral relations have significantly deepened over the past 33 years. On the other, it raises the question of how much it truly reflects reality. Recent developments in diplomacy, economic, and military cooperation reveal that beneath the surface there is a notable intensification of asymmetry, which Beijing seeks to conceal through compensatory measures.

Diplomatic Sphere

Since the elevation of bilateral relations to an “all-weather partnership” in 2022 – the pinnacle of China’s diplomatic hierarchy – there has been a noticeable increase in high-level diplomatic engagements. The previous decline was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which imposed restrictions on direct interactions. The recent rise, however, including engagements with members of the Permanent Committee of the Politburo, who occupy the most influential echelons of power in China, underscores a concerted effort by both nations to reinforce their cooperative ties.

In 2024, a high-level meeting took place between Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, and Natalia Kochanova, Chairwoman of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus. And while official statements from both nations underscored the strengthening of their partnership and their shared opposition to Western sanctions and interference in internal affairs, the nuances in these very statements revealed divergent perspectives on the relationship. Leji’s remarks were broad, prioritizing China’s core interests like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, while highlighting Belarus’s role in advancing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In contrast, Kochanova delivered a more detailed address, focusing on economic cooperation, healthcare, education, science, and culture, as well as the bilateral collaboration within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Belarus’s aspirations to join the BRICS.

The most significant diplomatic event of 2024 was Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Minsk. Several key bilateral cooperation agreements were signed, including an agreement on trade in services and investment, which Belarus anticipates will boost service exports to China by 12-15 percent and increase Chinese investments in the country by at least 30 percent. And while the visit was deemed successful, subtle differences emerged in the addresses of both leaders. Premier Li spoke broadly about the newly forged partnership, whereas President Lukashenko took a more pragmatic stance, emphasizing investment outcomes and efforts to develop new investment projects. The most notable distinction concerned their objectives for further development of bilateral ties, with Lukashenko aiming to elevate economic and investment cooperation to the level of political collaboration, while Premier Li focused on a broader aim of fostering “stable” cooperation across various sectors.

Economic Sphere

Belarus’s economic collaboration with China has primarily centered on two key areas: bilateral trade and Chinese investments in Belarus. The growth of export volumes is perhaps the most positive trend in this relationship, as highlighted in official communications and state media. During an official meeting with his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang, Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko stated that bilateral trade has increased 140 times in the past 30 years, whereas BelTA state media reported that Belarusian exports to China increased 16 times in 2024.

Yet, a closer examination reveals a more complex picture. Between 2022 and 2024, Belarusian exports to China grew by only 0.5 percent, whereas Chinese exports to Belarus surged by 103 percent, resulting in a trade deficit that ballooned to nearly $5 billion. This stark imbalance highlights deeply problematic economic cooperation between the two – an issue that both parties have opted to address with strategic silence.

An even closer look at China’s exports to Belarus reveals an average growth of 22 percent from 2019 to 2022, primarily driven by vehicles, electrical machinery, nuclear reactors, and optical, photographic, and cinematographic components. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China’s exports to Belarus skyrocketed by 103 percent, fueled by the same categories, while other exports remained stable. Notably, many of these items are listed on the “Unified High Priority List” from the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, indicating their connection to Russia’s war efforts. This suggests that Belarus may function as a conduit for indirect China-Russia trade, including for sensitive items used in the war against Ukraine.

In contrast, Belarus’s exports to China remain significantly less diverse, growing by only 0.4 percent between 2019 and 2024. While there was a notable 50 percent surge following the onset of the war in Ukraine, exports remained largely unchanged in 2024 compared to 2022. The primary export commodities included fertilizers, meat and edible offal, animal, vegetable, and microbial fats and oils, as well as timber and wood products.

Regarding China’s investments in Belarus, official reports indicate that since 2008, Belarus has launched 27 projects with China’s assistance, raising over $5 billion through direct investments and “tied loans.” From 2006 to 2024, direct investments totaled approximately $461 million, directed towards transportation, construction, and infrastructure, followed by real estate, hospitality, and consumer goods. Given the modest levels of direct investment, “tied loans” play a significant role, requiring Belarus to allocate 50-70 percent of the funds to purchasing Chinese goods and services – an arrangement that has proven problematic.

In a 2021 directive, Lukashenko set a goal of securing at least $500 million annually from sources like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. Despite this ambition, reports from January to September 2021 revealed that Belarus received only $14.9 million from the China Eximbank. China’s reluctance to extend loans became even more apparent when it suspended financing for the “Slavkaliy” potash mining project at the end of 2021. Additionally, in March 2022, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s halted loan provisions to both Russia and Belarus. These developments highlight China’s cautious approach, shaped by Western sanctions on Lukashenko’s regime and Belarus’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Moreover, the stagnation in China’s investment cooperation with Belarus is evident in the lack of new, publicly disclosed investment projects. The last significant agreements were signed in 2020, yet they have received minimal coverage – especially in official Chinese communications and state media. Notably, the BRI’s official website last mentioned a major project in Belarus in 2022, featuring an agro-industrial complex. This silence raises questions about the vitality of future bilateral collaborations and the depth of ongoing engagements.

Security and Military Front

Belarus’s security cooperation with China intensified in 2024, when the former became the first European country to join the SCO, focused on security, economic, political, and cultural cooperation. The accession of Belarus to the SCO was followed by “counter-terrorism” military exercises with China in Brest, near Poland’s border. And while analysts suggest these exercises were not directly triggered by Belarus’s accession to the SCO, their location near the borders of a NATO member signals China’s increasing ability to be engaged in European security matters, akin to NATO’s activities in the Indo-Pacific region.

Previous Sino-Belarusian military cooperation includes the jointly developed “Polonez” missile artillery system, operational since 2016. In 2023, reports indicated that the Belarusian army had received new components for missile systems from China, raising concerns in the West that Belarus might transfer Polonez to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. However, considering that Polonez uses missiles manufactured in China and Beijing seeks to avoid crossing the West’s red lines, China would likely be hesitant to agree to such transfers.

Nevertheless, the potential for China to supply military components in the future is suggested by several meetings that occurred in 2024. In July, Belarus’s First Deputy Minister of Defense, Pavel Muraveiko, met with Liu Zhe, the defense attaché of the Chinese Embassy in Belarus, to explore ways to strengthen defense cooperation. In November, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin held talks with Zhang Wenchuan, China’s Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Belarus, to discuss further military cooperation between the countries. Beyond military cooperation, Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Belarus in August resulted in a more detailed agreement on security cooperation, including collaboration on cybersecurity and digital security issues.

Masking the Peak’s Low Point

Since their establishment in 1992, China-Belarus relations have reached the highest level in China’s diplomatic hierarchy, underpinned by high-level meetings, proclaimed trade and investment growth, and security and military cooperation. While these developments suggest an increasingly comprehensive partnership, a closer look reveals that China is cautiously managing this relationship, prioritizing its own strategic interests, which in turn exacerbates the asymmetry in cooperation.

To obscure this imbalance, Beijing employs compensatory measures, such as promoting the “Great Stone” Industrial Park as a flagship project and integrating Belarus into several multilateral organizations like the SCO and BRICS. These initiatives offer Belarus opportunities to forge new partnerships with Eastern nations, such as India, thereby enabling it to achieve what Lukashenko terms “balance and economic stability.”

However, the sustainability of these measures remains uncertain, given the lack of tangible outcomes from these initiatives. This skepticism is reinforced by Lukashenko’s own criticism of the SCO and BRICS as mere discussion platforms. Nevertheless, Belarus appears to be reconciling itself with a reality marked by unfulfilled expectations. Ultimately, Minsk finds itself relying on an illusory anchor in Beijing while navigating the precarious waters of Western sanctions, increasing isolation and uncertainty over continued Russian support.