The Porcupine Strategy: Taiwan’s Road to Self-Defense

The rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Xi Jinping has significant implications for Taiwan’s chances of successfully defending itself by using purely conventional means of warfare. As such, the question of how to re-establish deterrence and adopt a strategy that would allow Taiwan to defend itself – at least from an initial attack – has become a centerpiece of international discussions.

Drawing from lessons learned during the Japanese invasion of the late 1800s, the discussions surrounding asymmetric defense – long advocated for by the US – has resurfaced within Taiwan’s political establishment. The concept of asymmetric warfare – also called the Porcupine strategy – builds on the idea of achieving deterrence by denial, making it costly for China to launch an invasion in the first place. Moreover, even if deterrence fails, asymmetric defense is said to provide Taiwan with better chances to withstand a fight in its littoral areas. The war in Ukraine has further reiterated the benefits of asymmetric defense when it comes to engaging with a militarily superior power.

However, while the political establishment under President Lai Ching-te seems to be keen on boosting Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities, the strategy is still viewed with skepticism among the island’s armed forces. To be able to truly bring about the undue and comprehensive reform of Taiwan’s military, one of Lai’s core tasks will, thus, be to navigate through the complex internal dynamics while advocating for paradigm and cultural shifts among the country’s armed forces. Moreover, as a potential Chinese invasion would significantly disrupt the global supply chains – especially (but not exclusively) those related to semiconductors – the discussions around the idea of Taiwan’s ‘Silicon Shield’ have re-emerged as well, with potential implications for the EU’s (and indeed CEE’s) own semiconductor ambitions.

Growing Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

As Beijing has been improving its warfare capabilities, it has also been increasing its pressure on Taiwan. Just a few weeks before Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2024, Xi referred to the reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as “historically inevitable.” However, the drivers behind the current palpable sense of urgency to upgrade Taiwan’s self-defense are not only China’s assertive rhetoric, but also the growing number and frequency of the PLA’s incursions into Taiwan’s sea and air space.

Indeed, China’s military drills around the island and intrusions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which have increased significantly in both 2020 and 2022, has become even more prominent under Lai, whom Beijing views as a “separatist.” Unsurprisingly, Beijing has responded to Lai’s inauguration with large-scale military drills just three days after Lai assumed office. Following the incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ by 66 Chinese military aircrafts in July and a large-scale amphibious landing exercise in Fujian’s Dacheng Bay in September, the most recent incursions occurred after Taiwan’s National Day celebrations. The deployment of 153 aircrafts, 28 of which were reported to have crossed the median line as part of China’s Joint Sword military drills on October 14, marked a new daily record, albeit a missile launch akin to China’s response to Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022 was missing.

This is important, as the growing number and frequency of China’s military drills around the island are making it difficult to detect and differentiate between early signs of invasion preparations and mere military exercises. As a result, it is becoming increasingly challenging for Taiwan to ready its forces and effectively respond to a sudden attack.

An Overdue Reform

Taiwan has long been criticized by foreign observers for not investing enough into reforming its deteriorating military capabilities, making poor organizational choices, and failing to improve the quality of both its active-duty and reservist forces.

Since Taiwan’s former president Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in 2016, she overhauled Taiwan’s traditional approach to defense by increasing Taiwan’s defense spending, which now amounts to almost double to what it used to be prior to her tenure; reinstating the island’s one-year compulsory military conscription; as well as increasing the pay and unveiling a new curriculum for the conscripts. Moreover, it was under Tsai, that the former Chief of the General Staff of the ROC Armed Forces, Admiral Lee Hsi-min, advanced an asymmetry-based approach dubbed the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), endorsed by the US defense circles, but which did not survive Lee’s tenure.

Indeed, the failure to maintain the ODC is demonstrative of the key issue, which lies within the political culture of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Their rigid and conservative thinking, along with their preference for conventional means of warfare (and thus big-ticket weapons, including fighter jets, submarines, and large warships) as well as highly centralized command structures, has created a significant barrier to effectively reform Taiwan’s military by adopting a more innovative, asymmetric, and layered defense, based on the acquisition of larger quantities of smaller, yet more agile, conceivable, and survivable military equipment. As a consequence, once Lee retired, a more balanced approach was adopted; and while the conventional and asymmetric systems were viewed as complementary, more resources were channeled towards traditional platforms, with several asymmetric programs canceled.

Understanding the Asymmetry

Besides the institutional culture, several analysts have also made the point about the differing threat perceptions between Taiwan and the US, which may further explain some of the MND’s long-standing hesitancy about asymmetric defense. While the US defense establishment has focused predominantly on the threat of a full-scale invasion, defense circles in Taiwan have long emphasized the threats associated with a potential blockade and China’s grey-zone activities. These perceptions are, however, changing, with the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Palestine playing a significant role in this, as seen during Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim’s references to lessons learned from the war in Ukraine during her speech at a conference hosted by Chatham House.

Lai himself has emphasized building Taiwan’s asymmetric abilities, including further strengthening the island’s civil defense, while trying to address some of the more structural issues such as the armed forces’ nationalist legacy, which is behind the ongoing frictions between Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the army. Another sign of a greater move towards asymmetry came with the annual Hang Kuang exercises that took place in July. The July drills were noteworthy, as the usual week of scripted, pre-rehearsed performances was replaced by a battlefield training, with a focus on the adaptability of small units and their tactical and operational decision-making, with several defense experts praising such move as a sign of Taiwan taking its defense seriously, especially as the hierarchical and centralized structures have long been criticized as inadequate to meet actual emergencies.

Lai has also appointed Wellington Koo as his Minister of Defense. Being Taiwan’s first civilian defense minister, Koo has already unveiled several aspects of his defense policy that are signaling a greater move towards asymmetry. One aspect that has been widely discussed is the tactic of urban warfare, which is based on the island’s topographical predispositions and high population density of its urban areas, both of which are believed to increase Taiwan’s chances to hold-off China’s takeover until the arrival of the US and other allies.

The new administration has further emphasized the importance of investing into drones, surface-to-air missiles, and land-based anti-ship missiles, instead of pouring money into large warships and aircrafts. This is important not only when considering the heavy criticism received by Tsai’s indigenous submarine program and continued purchases of conventional weapons, but also given the history of severe underinvestment in Taiwan’s defense sector. In this way, the porcupine strategy presents a more affordable option, which would decrease the pressure on Taiwan’s government to further increase its defense spending.

At the same time, to give credit where the credit is due, it is important to note that Taiwan has already taken several steps in this direction. Particularly noteworthy has been Taiwan’s introduction of several indigenous military drones in 2023, which are equipped with combat or surveillance capabilities and can be used within different military divisions. Taiwan has also produced air and sea defense missiles, small missile corvettes, and mine-laying ships.

Semiconductors and National Security

While the increasing tech cooperation between Taiwan and the EU, including its CEE member states like Czechia, involves discussions about potential arms deals or R&D cooperation in critical technology (including drones), there are also significant economic reasons as to why the EU and CEE should be interested in Taiwan’s defense.

Considering Taiwan’s leading role in the global semiconductor production, and the EU’s own ambitions in this area, it is important not to underestimate the global economic implications of a Taiwan Strait contingency, which would have significant effects on the EU’s pursuit of economic security and strategic ambiguity. Indeed, not only are semiconductors essential for our own defense systems and military applications, but our pursuit of digital sovereignty.

Indeed, Taiwan is aware of its indispensability, as the ‘Silicon Shield’ concept may suggest. This concept has long been linked to the arguments against offshoring Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing. While these concerns are valid, it is important to understand that the US and EU goals of building their own semiconductor capacities are long-term, and there are already several issues when it comes to labor and infrastructure the envisioned industrial clusters require. Taiwan will thus continue being an indispensable partner to both the US and the EU when it comes to their own security (both hard and economic) interests.

Against such background, Taiwan ‘s continued focus on strengthening its existing and building new semiconductor partnerships with allies, especially those that are most likely to advocate for Taiwan’s interests at different regional and international fora, is the right way to go. Indeed, when it comes to Taiwan’s allies in CEE – namely, Czechia, Lithuania, and to lesser extent also Slovakia and Poland – there are already several Taiwanese scholarships available that offer opportunities for students from these four countries to go and study semiconductor-related degree programs or participate in such summer schools in Taiwan.