Why CEE Is Interesting for Chinese Military Diplomacy 

Beijing’s armed forces are a powerful actor in the Chinese system with their own role in the country’s foreign policy – also in CEE. Serbia’s unique place in Chinese defense cooperation should not obscure the growing relevance other CEE countries have for Beijing’s military intelligence. An established defense attaché network in the region reflects this fact.

Russia’s war against Ukraine – and the related increase in Asian military presence in the region – makes it necessary for Beijing to gather military intelligence in CEE. North Korean soldiers and laborers are fighting against Ukraine, South Korean weapons receive an increasingly broad welcome in the region, especially in Poland, and Taiwanese “China-free” drones have begun appearing in Czech and Polish custom data.

Defense Attachés on the Ground

A survey by this author shows Beijing’s comprehensive network of defense attachés in CEE countries. The websites of Chinese embassies in 22 CEE countries indicate that 20 have active postings. The exceptions are Kosovo and Lithuania. Beijing does not recognize Kosovo’s independence. Since 2025 there have been no Chinese diplomats in Lithuania following the downgrading of the embassy in 2021.

The near-comprehensive coverage of the region indicates its relative weight. With more than 170 embassies globally, in 2019 Beijing reported 130 military attachés or representatives – roughly three fourths. The presence in CEE is thus above the global average and only fails to reach 100 percent for political reasons. Due to their relative size, economic development, and strategic position, CEE countries are important places for the public and not-so-public work of China’s defense attachés. The active NATO deployments and Russia’s ongoing war make the region an important military intelligence target. Defense attachés play a crucial role in that work.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) uses its diplomatic representatives abroad for two purposes: open interactions and covert intelligence gathering. The regular military diplomacy is important to consider in its own right given that the PLA is separate from the Chinese state. This particular function of attachés is managed by the Office for International Military Cooperation (OIMC) of the Central Military Commission (CMC), using the Ministry of National Defense (MND) as a civilian façade.

China’s defense attachés, even more so than those of other countries, also have an intelligence role. Chinese military intelligence – ever since Xi’s reforms known as the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department (JSDIB) – has always had a system to steer this part of defense attachés’ work, as described by Chinese intelligence experts Mattis and Brazil and Hamilton and Ohlberg. Roger Faligot’s compendium on Chinese espionage adds that China’s civilian intelligence, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), relies on defense or police attachés to serve as liaison with foreign countries to keep up the pretense that it has no agents stationed at embassies.

Both functions are most likely largely passive in daily operations. Yet, the knowledge of the lay of the land by locally accredited representatives is essential to make active operations effective. When Chinese military intelligence recruited an Estonian scientist in 2018, this was done on Chinese soil. Yet, the growth of Chinese security interest in the CEE region since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is clear from the overall rise in actions involving all components of the Chinese security state. 

Active Exchanges Center on Serbia

The official exchanges with CEE countries are limited when one excludes Belarus and Russia. The American National Defense University’s database of Chinese military diplomacy shows that since the pandemic, bilateral exchanges have been limited. In March 2021, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe – later purged – visited Hungary, Serbia, Greece, and North Macedonia. In November 2025, CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia – the PLA’s most senior officer before his purge – and Defense Minister Dong Jun separately met the visiting Serbian Defense Minister.

When it comes to hard military cooperation, Serbia stands out. In the summer of 2025, Serbia caused European concern when it became the first EU-adjacent country to undertake joint military exercises with China – the Guardian of Peace 2025 – practicing drone tactics and special forces operations. This cooperation is backed up by regular exchanges the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU) maintains with Belgrade, most recently by visiting in May 2026.

Furthermore, Serbia has in recent years seriously expanded its arsenal of China-made weapons. According to SIPRI, in the 2020-2024 period, 57 percent of Serbian arms imports came from China. These included drones and air defense systems. Its 2023 FTA with China covers weapons systems too. Importantly, the Chinese weapons systems used by Serbia include drones and missiles.

Yet, active Chinese military exchanges also affect CEE countries outside the Western Balkans. This became clear with the Eagle Assault military drills China held with Belarus in July 2024 near Brest, involving PLA Northern Theater Command troops and the Belarussian special forces. The location, only 5 kilometers from the Polish border, and the timing, around a NATO summit, could not have been but a clear signal. The cognitive effect of such messaging on Poland and the Baltic states, too, is part of China’s military diplomacy in the CEE region.

Limited Engagement with Persistent Presence

Beyond Russia, Belarus, and Serbia, the PLA’s most eye-catching military diplomacy in CEE countries is limited. Often NATO-aligned and fearful of Russian intentions, most CEE countries have no interest in actively cooperating with the Chinese military. That still, however, leaves the passive presence described in the section on defense attachés. Their dual function means these defense attachés play important strategic functions.

The alternative to Western options that the PLA can offer to Serbia’s current government does not appeal to EU member states wary of the Russian threat and with a more positive view of NATO. The related view of Europe’s regional order invokes talking points that remind one of Russian stances: Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) calls for “indivisible security” and the rejection of “bloc confrontation” – rhetoric that could directly affect the region if widely accepted, given its legitimation of imperialist Russian ambition.

Beyond the “hard” military cooperation with Russia, Belarus, and Serbia, the PLA’s “soft” influence work seems to focus on bigger players outside CEE. Yet, that does not mean Beijing does not watch the region closely. Its passive presence as described in this article testifies to that. In other words: this part of Europe needs to be recognized as a relevant arena for Asian military diplomacy. As the European and Indo-Pacific theaters become increasingly intertwined, China cannot afford to ignore CEE.