COP29 and Beyond: Is China Holding the Trump Card?

“Shameful COP29 climate talks,” “frantic diplomacy,” “a staggering betrayal of the world’s most vulnerable,” and “a deal that very nearly never was.” Views on the outcome of the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP29) and its accompanying negotiations vary, with several pointing to the growing divide between developed and developing countries. Yet, there is one country that, according to many, seemed to have emerged as a beacon of hope – China.

Global Aspirations and Domestic Actions

Simon Stiell, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, stated that the world “will need China’s continued leadership” to meet climate goals, while the environment minister of South Africa emphasized that China “has an opportunity to lead the global fight against climate change.” Both remarks highlight the critical role China may come to play, especially if the US withdraws from the Paris Agreement, which is widely expected to happen under the second Trump administration. How the world’s largest annual emitter approaches the green transition – both domestically and internationally – will thus be essential for the future climate negotiations.

Indeed, such a shift may have already been underway at COP29, with China described as “unusually cooperative,” and Chinese delegates as working “to soothe angry delegations from India, Saudi Arabia, Africa and the small island groups during the tense final plenary.” When asked whether Beijing will deliver a strong nationally determined contribution (NDC) – its climate plan with a 2035 target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, due February 2025 – Zhao Yingmin, the head of China’s COP29 delegation, responded: “China has contributed in addressing climate change. But in the future, China will do our best to contribute more.”

Looking at China’s track record, several trends point to practices that other countries might consider emulating. For example, in the first half of 2024, China’s approval of new coal power plant projects fell by 83 percent compared to the previous year, and the growth in carbon emissions has slowed, indicating that the emissions peak could be near. Additionally, clean energy generated over 40 percent of China’s electricity in May 2024, and the country’s 2030 target of 1,200 GW of wind and solar capacity was achieved six years ahead of schedule. The clean energy sectors were the largest driver of China’s economic growth and contributed 40 percent to China’s overall GDP growth in 2023. Abroad, within the Belt and Road initiative, China is to cease building new coal plants and invest in renewables, though fossil fuel investments dominated in 2013-2022. Lastly, whether it is for reasons of economic growth, national security or geopolitical interests, the Chinese approach pushed the US and the EU to grow their own climate-friendly industries.

Negotiating Finance and Emissions Reductions

On the international climate stage, China positions itself as the leader of the developing world. At COP29, China played a crucial role in negotiating the main agenda item – the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance. The NCQG builds on the climate finance goal from 2009, when developed countries – Annex-II countries that encompass 24 countries and the European Economic Community – committed to annual mobilization of $100 billion for developing countries by 2020 (in 2015 postponed to 2025). In Baku, at COP29, many of the Annex-II countries, including the EU and the US, hoped that responsibility to contribute to the new goal will now be shared with more countries, especially in light of the current international order and the growing GDP of emerging economies. What is more, a broader base of contributors was believed to allow for a larger pool of mobilized finance.

With all eyes on China, Zhao Yingmin reaffirmed the country’s long-standing stance that the responsibility for the new finance goal “lies with developed countries.” At the same time, Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang revealed that since 2016, China has “provided and mobilized” more than $24.5 billion in project funds for developing countries’ climate responses, which was the first time Beijing provided clarity on its past contributions using the UN accounting terminology for financial flows from developed to developing countries. Ding’s statement also indicated that China’s contributions are on par with those of many developed nations, including the UK. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what the $24.5 billion figure covers, and whether it primarily consists of grants or loans with strings attached.

Going back to the NCQG negotiations, it was agreed that developed countries would provide at least $300 billion annually by 2035 to support the developing countries’ climate actions. Moreover, all actors are now expected to scale up financing for developing countries from both public and private sources to at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2035. In line with China’s position, developing countries are encouraged to make voluntary contributions, including through South-South cooperation and, importantly for countries like China, the United Arab Emirates or Singapore, a country’s status as a development or recipient nation will not change.

China’s Climate Diplomacy

In addition to the NCQG, a lot of attention was paid to the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which indicate how (un)ambitious countries are in keeping global temperature rise below 1.5-2°C. With China announcing back in 2020 that it aims to achieve the CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060 (the so-called “dual-carbon goal”), it reaffirmed at COP29 that its updated NDC, with a 2035 target, will be economy-wide and cover all greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, with the US potentially stepping back from climate negotiations, particular focus will be on China’s NDC and the potential adjustment of its dual-carbon goal timeline.

However, China’s historical emissions within its borders now surpass those of the 27 EU member states combined. This is a crucial point, as China has consistently invoked the principle of historical responsibility and “common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities” when arguing for developed countries to take the lead in climate action. Despite this, Zhao emphasized that the financial commitments from developed countries still “fall far short of meeting the needs of developing nations” and that the developed countries’ “financial obligations must be further clarified.”

Linking the above-mentioned agenda items and broader processes outside the UNFCCC, a recurring theme at COP29 was global cooperation. Notably, the EU-China relationship played a pivotal role in unlocking the NCQG deal, with the EU becoming China’s primary interlocutor. Building on prior US-China agreements at previous COPs that showcased the willingness of both superpowers to implement systematic climate policies, the EU-China relationship may become the most significant driver of climate action for the near future.

At the same time, China has been critical of the green trade barriers imposed by both the US and the EU, even submitting a proposal on behalf of Brazil, India, and South Africa to include “climate-change-related unilateral restrictive trade measures” on the COP’s agenda. And while this new item was ultimately not included, intense discussions about policies like the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism did occur under response measures, an agenda item of increasing importance.

On a more positive note, China and the US explored alternative channels for sustaining climate communication under Trump, emphasizing the need for subnational cooperation. This was marked by China’s plan to host the next high-level US-China subnational climate event in the first half of 2025, aiming to keep the spirit of bilateral and multilateral cooperation alive. Additionally, various China-Global South initiatives were launched. China also participated at the G20 meeting, where world leaders reaffirmed their commitments to multilateralism and the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal of 1.5°C, using much stronger language than in previous years, while underlining the importance of both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

A New Model for Global Climate Leadership?

In the context of what has been termed as an “upside-down COP,” with Russia urging the US to remain in the Paris Agreement, and the United Arab Emirates calling on all Parties to stick to the COP28 outcome and transition away from fossil fuels, it is perhaps not surprising to hope for the world’s largest annual greenhouse gas emitter to assume a stronger leadership role in global climate action. Afterall, this aligns well with China’s guiding philosophy of “ecological civilization,” which seeks to resolve tensions between “environmental protection and economic development through concrete initiatives such as renewable energy promotion, carbon reduction, and reforestation.”

As many speculate whether ecological civilization does indeed hold the potential “for a more assertive and confident China to assume a stronger leadership role in global environmental debates,” COP29 may have been a first sign of China’s evolving strategy to drive climate action on a global scale.