Orbán or the Opposition? Hungary’s Election and the Future of Its China–Taiwan Calculus

This article is part of an exclusive series from CHOICE devoted to China as a topic in elections across Central and Eastern Europe.

Hungary’s election this Sunday is being watched with unusual intensity, not only at home but across foreign capitals. After 16 consecutive years in power, Viktor Orbán faces his most serious political challenge from Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party, opening a rare possibility for the country to change course. While there is a lot at stake for Hungarian voters, the significance of this contest reaches beyond Hungary’s borders. Major powers are following it closely, underscored by overt and covert support to Fidesz, such as the US Vice President JD Vance’s visit to Budapest and the reports on Russian agents’ presence in the country. This election is increasingly being cast as a broader strategic choice about Hungary’s future direction, whether it remains anchored in the West or continues to deepen ties towards the East. That choice could also prove consequential for Budapest’s approach to China and Taiwan – an area where Hungary has stood out within the EU.

Why Taiwan Matters Now

If this election reflects a bet on Hungary’s wider geopolitical orientation, Taiwan might be one of the places where that choice may eventually matter. The recent war in Iran has revived questions about whether the US can sustain attention across multiple theatres and sharpened debates in Taiwan over deterrence, energy resilience, and how far the island can rely on outside support. This matters beyond East Asia. Taiwan is a crucial strategic and economic node at the heart of global trade and the semiconductor supply chain, and any crisis would carry consequences far beyond the Taiwan Strait. For that reason, Taiwan deserves greater attention in European debates, not as a regional issue but as a question of economic security and geopolitical credibility. And given Hungary’s well-established closeness to Beijing, the election becomes all the more consequential in assessing whether that position may begin to shift.

Taiwan’s Increasing Engagement with Europe

The Hungary-Taiwan relations must be considered in the broader context of Taiwan’s engagement with the EU. Taiwan is a natural partner for the Union, grounded in shared values such as democracy and the rule of law, as well as the commitment to uphold multilateralism and the rules-based international order. The ties between the two have been substantially warming up in recent years, as exemplified by six official visits by the European Parliament (EP) delegations – the latest of which took place this January – as well as the creation of the EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue.

Amid the second Trump presidency and the uncertainty it has generated in Taiwan, the converging interests with the EU are drawing greater attention. President Lai administration’s current emphasis on Europe is reflected in developments such as the launch of a VE Day (Victory in Europe Day) commemoration ceremony for the first time, or Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim’s address to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) in November last year – also the first time a Taiwanese vice president spoke before the EP. Within these dynamics, Taiwan also has a greater involvement with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

The Focus on CEE

Since 2021, CEE has become a particularly active arena for Taiwan’s outreach. Among the enthusiastic partners, Lithuania specifically stood out as a focal point after allowing the opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, followed by plans to deepen political and economic cooperation, despite heavy pressure and criticism from China. However, five years on, doubts have surfaced as to whether the action has brought much tangible benefit, with the current Lithuanian Prime Minister signaling openness to renaming the office. The Czech Republic has also emerged as a key partner with repeated visits to Taipei by the Czech Senate representatives, high-level exchanges, and the country’s consistent support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

Engagement with other countries of the region, such as Slovakia or Poland, has also deepened through economic, scientific, and humanitarian initiatives. Among these are eight Taiwan-Slovakia MoUs as well as the landmark agreement on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters, which is still the only agreement of such kind between Taiwan and an EU member state. Poland, too, fits this pattern with expanding links reaching from cybersecurity to energy efficiency and the drone industry, as well as to aid coordination and the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. In the context of these more high-profile cases in the region, Hungary stands out less, though its role in Taiwan-CEE relations should not be overlooked.

Hungary – The Outlier

Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Budapest has frequently been referenced as Beijing’s closest European ally, championing the expanding economic ties, continuous high-level engagements, and even security cooperation. It is thus not a surprise that Hungary handles its relations with Taipei cautiously. As opposed to the symbolic political gestures visible in Lithuania or Czechia, Hungary-Taiwan relations have become more of a quiet partnership shaped by pragmatic calculations and centered on economic and functional cooperation. For Budapest, Taiwan is a commercial partner and an entry point to the high-value industrial networks – not an ideological cause.

Over the last five years, the majority of public agreements remained solely in the practical sphere, for example, the regular economic and agricultural dialogues, the agreement on autonomous vehicle testing in 2022, and the smart-city MoU in 2023. The commercial core of the relationship is substantial. The bilateral trade volume reached $1.8 billion in 2025, and Taiwanese FDI to Hungary stands at $1.37 billion in the EU, second only to Taiwan’s investment in the Netherlands.

Hungary’s relationship with both China and Taiwan under Viktor Orbán has been defined by a pragmatic strategic flexibility. While Budapest cultivated close ties with Beijing, including shielding China from EU criticism, it has also quietly expanded commercial links with Taiwan without turning them into a political statement. This balance helps explain why Taiwanese investment has not emerged as a source of friction in Hungary-China relations. For Hungary, the Taiwanese capital is strictly business rather than ideology, and the overlap between Taiwanese and Chinese commercial ecosystems is visible in practice, for example, by Taiwanese Foxconn’s Komárom plant’s manufacturing role for Huawei. For Taiwan, this makes Hungary valuable as an economic entry point, but with limitations. Budapest is unlikely to risk potential clashes with Beijing over issues that would benefit Taiwan politically. The more politicized the Taiwan question becomes, the less willing Hungary will be to move beyond a trade-only approach.

Looking Ahead

Foreign policy rarely features high in the minds of the Hungarian electorate, but this election may carry meaningful implications in this domain. Tisza’s communication regarding China has been cautious, and Péter Magyar has placed little direct emphasis on the issue. At the same time, the party’s foreign minister-designate, Anita Orbán, signaled that Hungary should no longer act as an outlier within the EU and weaken European cohesion at the benefit of Russia or China. She has acknowledged the importance of maintaining economic ties with China and stressed the need to reduce strategic dependencies. More broadly, Tisza has indicated a more alliance-centered foreign policy, a departure from Orbán’s balancing approach. This would not necessarily mean a fundamental break with Hungary’s existing China policy, but it could foresee a more transparent and conventionally pragmatic version of it. This, in turn, could create somewhat greater space for developing relations with Taiwan as well.