CHOICE Newsletter: Between Two Giants: How Central and Eastern Europe Balances the US and China

Dear reader,

Across Europe, governments are discovering that “strategic autonomy” is not a slogan but a budgeting, procurement, and permitting question – and that the real pressure points sit where security guarantees, supply chains, and domestic politics collide. This month’s edition traces that collision line across Ukraine’s wartime balancing act between US security and China’s cost advantage, Estonia’s sharpened de-risking as infrastructure vulnerabilities come into view, and Poland’s still-transatlantic – but increasingly sober – assessment of reliance on Washington alongside managed economic exposure to China.

Our Brussels Corner looks at how Beijing is (once again) testing Europe where it hurts: agriculture. The latest tariffs on EU dairy underline how targeted pressure can turn a trade dispute into political leverage, and how quickly it can also harden attitudes inside the EU.

Finally, CHOICE is launching a new format (Long Reads), dedicated to longer-term research, written in a more narrative style and reflective than our shorter analyses. The section opens with a piece on how digital technologies reshape Chinese diasporas’ identity, with clear relevance to debates on transnational repression.

Also, if you haven’t yet applied to our summer school for early-career professionals and advanced students, here’s a kind reminder that the deadline is March 8.

Enjoy the read,

By Ivana Karásková, CHOICE Founder and Team Lead (based in Prague)

CHOICE Quick Takes

Ukraine Between Washington and Beijing

Ukraine’s foreign policy has long been defined by the difficulty of managing East-West pressures, prioritizing security alignment with the US and economic integration with the EU while maintaining selective economic engagement with China.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, Kyiv explored participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, yet the 2021 blocking of the Skyrizon acquisition of aircraft engine manufacturer Motor Sich signaled clear limits to Chinese involvement in strategically sensitive sectors. Since 2022, wartime constraints have curtailed infrastructure cooperation, but economic ties remain material. China reemerged in 2024 as Ukraine’s largest single-country trading partner, accounting for around 15 percent of total trade. Imports of electrotechnical components, drones, and affordable consumer goods support wartime resilience, yet Ukraine runs a negative trade balance with China, and disrupted logistics have largely constrained exports. This asymmetric interdependence provides short-term benefits while increasing long-term vulnerability given Ukraine’s reliance on Western support.

Looking ahead, post-war reconstruction is likely to prioritize Western capital and regulatory alignment with the EU, while permitting selective Chinese participation in non-sensitive sectors to accelerate rebuilding. Concurrently, Kyiv will have to navigate US, EU, and Chinese competition over critical raw materials, balancing trade opportunities against security guarantees and its broader Western-oriented strategy.

Tackling Challenges in the Nordic-Baltic Region

Estonia is too small to defend its territory from its eastern neighbor on its own. As outlined in the official Estonian foreign policy strategy 2026–2029, the US remains Estonia’s major security guarantor, and the US’ growing economic and geopolitical competition with China will not change the bigger picture for the Baltic state. On China, Estonia is getting more active in mitigating China-related risks due to increasingly visible China’s support for Russia’s sustained efforts in invading Ukraine. The vulnerability of Estonia’s critical infrastructure has been highlighted by the recent damage to Baltic Sea telecommunications cables involving the Chinese-flagged vessel Yi Peng 3.

As such, Estonia follows the EU’s overall strategy in de-risking its engagements with China, especially in economic terms. Instead of expanding Estonia’s footprint in the Chinese market, it prioritizes its economic activities with like-minded Asian partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Estonia’s strong alignment with the transatlantic alliance is exemplified by supporting the EU’s anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and its participation in the US-led Mineral Security Partnership to secure critical raw materials. Leaving aside the recent open conflict between the Estonian president and his government on peace talk with Russia, Estonia’s foreign policy remains US-reliant and China-skeptical. 

Sikorski Signals Strategic Caution

In his recent foreign policy exposé, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski made one point unmistakably clear: for Poland, security remains paramount. In the grand scheme of things, Russia’s war against Ukraine is a contest over the future shape of the global order – and whether Europe can emerge as a serious pillar alongside the US and China. Warsaw’s strategic instinct therefore remains firmly transatlantic. The US military presence, deepening defense cooperation, and large-scale arms procurement continue to anchor Poland’s security and international positioning.

Yet Sikorski’s tone was more sober than ever before. While Poland has long been among the most consistently pro-American countries in Europe, a degree of strategic caution is now emerging. Washington’s policy recalibrations, its turn toward hard political realism, and unpredictability regarding Ukraine and Russia have sparked debates in Warsaw about overreliance and, crucially, trust. This, however, does not amount to anti-Americanism. President Karol Nawrocki is a declared supporter of Donald Trump and remains openly pro-Atlanticist, underscoring that Poland’s embedding in the US-led security architecture remains strategically central.

Against this backdrop, China is treated neither as a partner nor as an enemy, but as a structural economic reality. Poland’s approach in this context mirrors the EU’s – trade where beneficial, emphasis on reciprocity, and reduction of vulnerabilities. Across wider CEE, the pattern seems similar – firm security and political alignment with the US, coupled with cautious, managed economic engagement with China seem to prevail in an era of geopolitical turmoil.

CHOICE in Brussels

China Targets European Agricultural Sector – Again

In February, dairy joined the list of European agricultural products targeted by Chinese tariffs amid the ongoing trade dispute between the EU and China. The duties of up to 11.7 percent imposed on European dairy products are down significantly from the first rates ranging from 21.9 to 42.7 percent announced back in December. This significant concession is seen as a sign of stabilizing relations between Beijing and Brussels. 

China has a domestic motivation to target these products. In recent years, Beijing has pushed for more food self-sufficiency. When it comes to dairy, China encouraged rapid expansion, modernization, and industrialization of domestic milk production. This top-down push combined with a slow-down in domestic consumption puts strain on the Chinese dairy industry. The tariffs on EU imports have therefore been welcomed as a relief for domestic dairy producers.

From an external perspective, these successive tariffs continue to show that Beijing grasps the sensitive political nature of certain sectors of European agriculture. Farmers’ protests over the last years, such as the ones against the Mercosur free trade agreement and green deal measures, have shown not only the deep struggles of Europe’s agrarian sector, but also the political weight of this industry in Brussels. 

For China, targeting particularly sensitive sectors has been an efficient way to create leverage vis-à-vis  EU member states at the negotiating table. For example, merely announcing its anti-dumping probe into EU pork in 2024 prompted Spain – Europe’s largest pork exporter – to call for negotiation and de-escalation of the trade dispute. 

But Beijing should be careful when ruffling European feathers as it might not have the effect it intends. A parliamentary assistant in the European Parliament told me that, in the end, Chinese tariffs on European pork led some Spanish Members of the European Parliament (who previously held back from firmer de-risking initiatives) to “flip on trade issues,” and underlined a feeling of profound annoyance.

By Emma Belmonte, CHOICE Analyst (based in Brussels)

WiCH Highlights

Alicia García-Herrero, WiCH Co-Chair for Spain, wrote an opinion piece for the Wire China on China’s involution trap. Read it here! 

Ana Krstinovska, WiCH Co-Chair for North Macedonia, was interviewed in the Sound of Economics podcast about China’s growing influence in the Western Balkans. Listen here!

Malin Oud, WiCH Co-Chair for Sweden, co-authored a feature on China’s political discourse and foreign policy narratives as a part of the Decoding China Dictionary. Read it here!

CHOICE News

 Konrad Szatters commented for South China Morning Post about the engagement of China’s firms in Ukraine (read it here).

  Ivana Karásková spoke to Poland’s public broadcaster TVP about China’s web of influence in Europe (watch it here) and recorded a podcast about how  CEE deals with Taiwan for Radio Taiwan International (listen here).

 Paulína Ovečková commented on China’s engagement in the Arctic for Seznam Zprávy (read it here).

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