CHOICE Newsletter: CEE Elections Shaping China Policy: Here’s What to Watch

Dear reader,

Elections across Central and Eastern Europe are reminding us that domestic politics can quickly reshape how countries approach China. In Slovenia, a fragmented post-election landscape may complicate the country’s alignment with the EU’s de-risking agenda, while in Bulgaria and Hungary, upcoming parliamentary contests could bring to power actors inclined to recalibrate relations with Beijing in very different ways. Together, these developments underline a broader point: China policy in CEE is not fixed, and electoral outcomes influence whether governments move closer to Beijing, keep a pragmatic balance, or realign more firmly with Brussels.

Beyond these political developments in CEE, we are also pleased to share some news from the CHOICE team. We are delighted to welcome two new colleagues. The first is Sense Hofstede, who now heads our Brussels office. Sense, a Dutch researcher with a PhD from Singapore and previous experience at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, joins our Brussels team alongside Konrad Szatters and Ema Belmonte. If you find yourself in Brussels, be sure to say hello! Our second new colleague is Selena Orly, who has completed both her PhD and postdoctoral research and is an active sinologist. She focuses on the PRC  domestic politics, Chinese intellectuals, and the translation of works by Chinese female scholars. Selena will also be joining me as my deputy.

As CHOICE continues to grow, we are excited to have both of them on board and look forward to the contributions they will make to our work.

By Ivana Karásková, CHOICE Founder and Team Lead (based in Prague)

CHOICE Quick Takes

If Orbán Loses, What Happens to Hungary’s China Ties?

Under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, Hungary has positioned itself as China’s closest ally within the EU. This bilateral relationship comprises sizable investments, primarily in electromobility as well as broad cooperation in security and technology. Strategically, pursuing close ties with Beijing reflects the Hungarian government’s aim for economic diversification, connectivity, and geopolitical balancing.

If the Tisza opposition party, which consistently leads in the polls, wins the upcoming parliamentary elections – and succeeds in forming a government – its absolute priority will be domestic policy: specifically, dismantling the system established by Fidesz since 2010. The key “foreign” policy objective would be restoring Hungary’s position within the EU. Such a government would not make abrupt changes in its policy toward China, but rather seek a rebalancing, moving away from political alignment toward a more measured and pragmatic approach.

Tisza acknowledges the vital role of FDI but emphasizes the risks of overreliance on “investments from the East.” Focusing on domestic issues and alleged government negligence, Tisza also promises to investigate the controversial Budapest-Belgrade railway built by China and the negative impacts of some Chinese investments on the environment and local businesses.

Slovenia’s Election: Divided at Home, Drifting Abroad?

Slovenia’s parliamentary elections on March 22 ended in a photo-finish, with Prime Minister Robert Golob’s center-left Freedom Movement narrowly defeating Janez Janša’s center-right Slovenian Democratic Party. In a fragmented political landscape, neither bloc secured a clear majority and will find it very difficult to form a coalition. The anti-establishment party Resni.ca (Truth), which entered the parliament for the first time, could be the kingmaker. Its Eurosceptic and pro-Russian leanings could complicate Slovenia’s alignment with EU-wide China de-risking strategies.

As such, Estonia follows the EU’s overall strategy in de-risking its engagements with China, especially in economic terms. Instead of expanding Estonia’s footprint in the Chinese market, it prioritizes its economic activities with like-minded Asian partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Estonia’s strong alignment with the transatlantic alliance is exemplified by supporting the EU’s anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and its participation in the US-led Mineral Security Partnership to secure critical raw materials. Leaving aside the recent open conflict between the Estonian president and his government on peace talk with Russia, Estonia’s foreign policy remains US-reliant and China-skeptical. 

Sofia Heads Toward a China-Friendly Government

Bulgaria is on the eve of yet another early parliamentary election after falling into a cycle of instability and short-lived cabinets since 2021. The former President Mr. Rumen Radev chose to leave office in January 2026 in order to compete in the upcoming election on April 19 and is widely predicted to be its winner with roughly a third of the vote. He has consistently espoused pro-Russian and Eurosceptic positions in office and oversaw the upgrading of diplomatic ties to China. His potential coalition partners also hold pro-Beijing attitudes.

Beijing has been intensifying its presence in the country. Geely is planning to reopen its car assembly plant which closed down in 2017 with auto parts producers such as Shanghai Unison Aluminium Products investing in two factories. Keen to implement its plans for the “middle corridor” via the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Chinese firms have renewed their interest in strategic infrastructure such as the sea and river ports in Bulgaria. This could extend into other sectors given Sofia’s plans to launch numerous infrastructure concessions. In this context, the question is not whether, but to what extent China will gain positions after the parliamentary election this month.

CHOICE in Brussels

EU Parliament Flies to China This Year: What For?

Last autumn, the European and Chinese parliaments resumed talks, pushing the reset button after a five-year freeze. This follows the lifting of Chinese sanctions against MEPs in April 2025 and reflects efforts by Parliament President Roberta Metsola to normalize ties with Beijing. Groups from the European Parliament are set to descend on Beijing. By the time  you receive this newsletter, a delegation of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) will have already landed in China. According to the official communication, the delegation will visit Beijing and Shanghai to “gain first-hand insight into China’s leadership in e-commerce, its customs and logistics systems, and their influence on consumer behavior and market trends.” The Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China (D-CN), led by the German parliamentarian Engin Eroglu, is scheduled to travel in May. And although it has not yet been communicated officially, according to the CHOICE sources within the EP, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) delegation is to visit China in July, and the Committee on International Trade (INTA) delegation in October. 

But how productive will these visits be? A constructive exchange between these delegations and their Chinese counterparts also remains an open question. To begin with, there exists a problem of understanding. It is true that recently the Chinese officials have moved away from the Xi-era signature ‘wolf-warrior’ confrontational style of diplomacy towards a more amicable attitude in dealing with their European colleagues, but European parliamentarians continue to report a feeling of “speaking to a wall”. This is because the Chinese officials communicate in a scripted, highly politicized and coded language that requires a learned expertise to decipher. The second obstacle to the productivity of these visits comes from within the European Parliament. Namely, both between and within political groups, there lacks a clear alignment on China. The disagreements show and are tangible: an AFET paper on China-EU relations, for example, has been in the works for a year now, but the date of its publication keeps getting postponed. That is to say: for these visits to be productive, the parliamentarians travelling to China should, first, master the language of Chinese diplomacy and, second, engage in informed discussions on China within their political groups to align positions.  

By Emma Belmonte, CHOICE Analyst (based in Brussels)

WiCH Highlights

Janka Oertel, WiCH Co-Chair for Germany, wrote a commentary on why Europeans should care about Beijing’s biosolutions. Read it here! 

Alicja Bachulska and Ivana Karásková, WiCH Co-Chairs for Poland and the Czech Republic, co-authored a paper describing China’s influence playbook in Europe. Read it here!

CHOICE News

 Ivana Karásková spoke at Yushan Forum 2026, and when in Taiwan, signed an MoU with DSET. She was also interviewed by the Czech Television for a documentary (watch it here) and a podcast (listen here) about Chinese involvement in the Czech Republic.

  Paulína Ovečková evaluated the Made in China 2025 strategy for iROZHLAS  (read it here).

 The paper co-authored by Ivana Karásková and Konrad Szatters was mentioned by Pub Affairs Brussels (read it here).

 We’re on Bluesky, LinkedIn, X, and Instagram! Stay updated with our latest articles, insights, and news by following our accounts – don’t miss out on valuable content and updates.

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