The cyberscam compounds in Southeast Asia run by Chinese-origin crime syndicates have drawn global attention for the sheer number of their victims. In response, multinational initiatives led by Thailand and China have sought to improve law enforcement cooperation. EU member states need to pay attention, not only because the scams occur in Europe too, but also because Beijing uses its response to shape international norms around its own notion of state security.
Evolving out of the so-called ‘pig-butchering scams’ in China, large-scale scam operations run from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar came of age with the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in 2020, and following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. Hundreds of thousands of people have been trafficked into forced labor. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated losses of $18-37 billion in 2023 for East and Southeast Asia alone, while the Global Anti-Scam Alliance put global losses at $442 billion in the year leading up to March 2025.
The Economist’s prize-winning podcast “Scam Inc.” conveys the global impact of this unprecedented criminal ecosystem. Governments, including those of China and Thailand, have launched crackdowns, and the issue is a factor in the military conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. The problem has grown far beyond technical law enforcement into the realm of international order-building.
From Intelligence Sharing to International Organization
Several initiatives are underway to address the massive challenge. In July, the Royal Thai Police launched the Scam & Human Trafficking Information Exchange and Linked Database (SHIELD) platform. This initiative facilitates intelligence sharing “specifically to combat transnational call center scam syndicates and human trafficking networks.” It has been adopted by Australia, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.
Beijing, meanwhile, is trying to address the problem while keeping it under its own control. The Lancang-Mekong Integrated Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Center (LM-LECC) in Kunming has been active since 2017 and has joined operations against scam compounds. The LM-LECC fits a longer pattern of Chinese order-building in the Mekong region. But China’s most recent efforts go even further.
In September, at the Lianyungang Global Public Security Cooperation Forum hosted by China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the International Alliance Combating Telecom and Cyber Fraud (IACTCF) was founded. According to Beijing, representatives from 46 founding countries, 34 observer countries, and four international organizations, including the UN and Interpol, attended the inaugural conference – although no full list has been published. The Chinese-language Xinhua report also states that the IACTCF puts into practice Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) and his Global Governance Initiative (GGI) – a reference missing from the English-language report. In other words, the new organization embodies Beijing’s approach to exporting its political values by “improving” and building on the existing international order rather than replacing it.
Security When Not All Criminals Are a Problem
China’s practical initiatives carry normative consequences. When Beijing organizes genuinely necessary efforts against cyberscammers under the GSI, European governments should take note. Xi’s initiative to address the “security deficit” in the world can only be understood through the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) definition of security. In contrast to the largely “external” military support that US allies receive, China’s security offering has long included a strong “internal security” focus, which shapes recipient countries’ domestic policing. The GSI exports a particularly authoritarian definition of “security.”
That definition includes the great-power-friendly concept of “indivisible security,” which helps legitimize Russia’s claims to its “near abroad.” It also includes the Party-centric view that “state security” is about the political security of the sitting regime. The Chinese word for it, guójiā ānquán (国家安全), is also used for “national security” – there is no distinction. This implies a view of law enforcement that creates two risks to Europe: it criminalizes certain conduct essential to the democratic process, and it condones or even endorses some criminal conduct that harms open societies.
China’s approach to the cyberscam crackdown illustrates that the CCP’s political interests are what need to be “secured” above all. Chinese state media portray the syndicates as something that is based abroad, leaving out the Chinese ties that enabled them. Instead, they present China as both a victim and a provider of public goods, as illustrated by a documentary by CGTN English co-produced with the MPS. Outside China, the crackdown’s respect for the sovereignty of Myanmar and Thailand was questioned as China took custody of suspects, ensuring control over both prosecution and disclosure. Meanwhile, Beijing’s definition of security is hostile to the civil society actors necessary to address root causes in both Cambodia and Myanmar.
Control of disclosure is necessary to guarantee “state security,” because the structural causes of the cyberscam problem contain much that would embarrass Beijing. Several factors that enabled the centers’ rise relate to the nature of China’s political system and to its neighborhood diplomacy. Martin Thorley coined the concept of “systemic geocriminality” to describe the structural engagement of Party officials with criminal networks. In Thorley’s reading, local governments and united front workers tolerate the networks’ activities while shaping the conditions under which they operate abroad, so that these activities do not harm CCP interests – and may even serve them.
The IACTCF cannot address the root causes of the scam centers, since it leaves untouched the political structures that enable them. Those Chinese officials who cooperated with, or even profited from, these syndicates initially saw little problem in their criminal activities. As long as both sides helped to promote Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or expanded Chinese influence over neighboring governments without causing too much trouble, the central government did not pay much attention either. Chinese support in Cambodia and Myanmar helped prolong the political situations that allow the centers to exist. Only when the scam industry had grown too large and too harmful did the hammer come down.
The EU Can Help Decide Which Approach Dominates
The issue of the cyberscam centers matters to the EU given the continent’s growing exposure to these scams and because the centers serve as a laboratory and supplier for scams worldwide. Deeper European involvement makes sense for practical reasons. Participation in platforms like Thailand’s SHIELD is simple self-interest. However, there are also geopolitical stakes that demand attention beyond the law enforcement community.
Cyberscams are a major concern for countries across much of the world. China’s response provides a public good that is in demand, however flawed its approach may be in the eyes of democracies. As enforcement in Southeast Asia intensifies and analysts warn of the risks of expansion to South Asia, Beijing is creating international structures under its control. The Lianyungang Forum also looks further west, with the 3rd China–East Africa Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation held this year. Beijing-led international law enforcement cooperation is spreading. As it does so, it takes shape in a form that serves CCP interests and spreads definitions of security that do not address the political conditions enabling the criminality, while helping autocrats crack down on political freedoms.
The EU and its member states can take concrete steps to help determine what approach comes out on top. Closer EU cooperation with ASEAN would strengthen both sides’ positions in their law enforcement cooperation with China, which remains necessary. Participating in the existing SHIELD initiative would increase the usefulness of Thailand’s offering vis-à-vis the LM-LECC, while avoiding duplication of efforts. Cooperation with other reliable Southeast Asian police organizations would make sense as well. To give European notions of law enforcement weight, the EU can draw on its strengths in capacity building and technological analysis, while its social media regulation can blunt scammers’ reach. The battle against cyberscams is also a political struggle that requires support for civil society actors and diplomatic efforts that put pressure on certain governments. In all of that, there is a role for the EU to play.
Written by
Sense Hofstede
sehofDr Sense Hofstede is the Head of AMO’s China Team Brussels Office and a China Analyst. He is an expert in the influence of the Chinese party-state on foreign policy, cross-Strait politics, and the Indo-Pacific. He has completed his PhD in Comparative Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore and has previously worked as a Lecturer at Leiden University and a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute.
