China as Belarus’s “Strategic Hedge” under Russian Dominance: The Role of the Great Stone Industrial Park

Belarus’s deep structural dependence on Russia has necessitated a cautious approach to external diversification, one that is designed to avoid challenging the foundation of its security arrangements, economic model, or political alignment. Within this context, Belarus’s engagement with China, particularly through the Great Stone Industrial Park, stands out as Minsk’s most prominent effort to prudently expand its limited strategic space. Rather than functioning as a conventional development project, the Great Stone initiative operates as a political-economic instrument that marginally expands Belarus’s room for maneuver while remaining embedded within the constraints created by its dependence on Moscow.

Russia as a Structural Constraint

Belarussian foreign policy is shaped by structural constraints arising from Russia’s role as the country’s primary security provider and dominant economic partner, a dynamic that has intensified since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Moscow supports Belarusian stability through subsidized oil and gas supplies, preferential lending, and episodic direct budgetary assistance, which together allow Minsk to save several billion US dollars annually. In addition to energy and finance, Russia remains the main destination for Belarusian exports, particularly machinery, agricultural products, and refined petroleum goods, making access to the Russian market a central pillar of economic sustainability.

This combination of energy dependence, export exposure, and security integration significantly constrains Minsk’s strategic autonomy and narrows the scope for alternative development trajectories. As a result, any attempt at diversification must be carefully calibrated to avoid undermining Russian interests or signaling a broader geopolitical reorientation.

Origins of the Great Stone

The China-Belarus Industrial Park originated in early discussions in 2010, when the concept was introduced during high-level talks in Minsk between the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Xi Jinping, then Vice President of the People’s Republic of China. These exchanges laid the political foundation for a more formalized bilateral cooperation. Around eighteen months later, the initiative was formalized through an intergovernmental agreement, which entered into force in January 2012 following ratification by both sides. Since then, the Great Stone Industrial Park has become the flagship project of Belarus-China economic cooperation. Conceived as a high-technology manufacturing and logistics hub near Minsk, the park functions as a platform for attracting Chinese investment, industrial activity, and selected technology transfers.

Chinese investments in the Great Stone Industrial Park amount to approximately $1.26 billion, which operates under a preferential regulatory framework offering tax exemptions and customs privileges that effectively create a quasi-autonomous investment enclave. This institutional environment has been particularly attractive to Chinese firms, which constitute a large share of resident companies and anchor much of the park’s economic activity. More broadly, Belarus has implemented a total of 27 China-supported projects involving over $5 billion in total financing. However, only $461 million of this sum consists of direct equity investment. The majority of Chinese financing has taken the form of state-backed loans tied to procurement conditions that require Belarus to direct a share of the funds to purchase Chinese equipment, services, and contractors, reinforcing China’s economic footprint within the park and associated projects.

By contrast, Russian energy subsidies alone have historically provided Belarus with implicit financial support of roughly $5 billion annually, amounting to approximately $54 billion over the 2011-2020 period. This disparity demonstrates the fundamentally distinct structural roles played by China and Russia in Belarus’s external economic relations. China’s engagement is project-based and institutionally bounded, while Russia’s support has been systemic, continuous, and macroeconomically indispensable.

Minimizing Geopolitical Friction

The institutional design of the Great Stone Industrial Park reflects a deliberate effort to minimize geopolitical friction rather than provoke strategic competition. The project does not threaten Russia’s dominant position as Belarus’s principal energy supplier, export destination, or security partner. Instead, it is framed as a complementary initiative embedded within Eurasian transport corridors and formally aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative, a framework in which Russia also participates.

For Beijing, the Great Stone functions as a controlled and low-risk channel of market entry. Chinese participation remains selective and commercially focused, concentrated on logistics, manufacturing, and technology-oriented activities. Unlike Russia, China has not extended large-scale fiscal transfers, energy subsidies, or security commitments. As a result, engagement through the Great Stone produces concrete economic gains for Belarus while remaining strategically limited from China’s perspective. This calibrated approach enables Beijing to expand its economic presence without assuming political or security responsibilities that could disrupt its broader relationship with Moscow.

Diplomatic Signaling and Bounded Autonomy

Despite its modest economic scale, the Great Stone carries diplomatic significance. Belarusian officials highlight the park as evidence of a “multi-vector” foreign policy and situate it within the broader official narrative of an “all-weather” partnership with China. High-level visits and bilateral statements reinforce this narrative, providing a framework to situate the project within. In May 2015, Xi Jinping visited Belarus and described the project as the “Pearl of the Silk Road.” In September 2016, Xi and Alexander Lukashenko met in Beijing, where the Belarusian president reemphasized Xi’s characterization of the project, further embedding it within the broader Belt and Road framework. Subsequent engagement, including the visit of then Chairman of Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress Zhang Dejiang in April 2017, reinforced the park’s role as a politically significant component of the bilateral relationship.

By institutionalizing Chinese interests in the Great Stone, Belarus gains a degree of diplomatic leverage and symbolic diversification. Yet this autonomy is tightly bounded. In moments of crisis like political unrest, economic shocks, or security pressures. Russia remains decisive for regime survival and macroeconomic stability. As shown by the protests in 2020, Russia is ready to support Belarus with military and resource assistance to assure regime stability.

Strategic Hedging Without Realignment

Ultimately, the Great Stone Industrial Park illustrates a broader structural reality: Belarus’s engagement with China is intended to supplement Russian dominance rather than to replace it. The limited leverage generated by cooperation with Beijing is effective precisely because it does not disrupt the existing hierarchy of Belarus’s external relationships.

China’s role in Belarus, centered on the Great Stone, therefore functions as a constrained strategic counterweight rather than a genuine alternative to Russian dominance. While the project provides Minsk with investment inflows, enhanced diplomatic engagement, and modest economic diversification, it operates firmly within the boundaries imposed by Belarus’s dependence on Russia for security guarantees, energy supplies, financial stabilization, and market access. As a result, cooperation with China expands Belarus’s room for maneuver only marginally, while Russia continues to remain the country’s dominant external partner.