China’s Double-Edged Sword in Georgia: Has Tbilisi Entered an Unequal Game?

In late September 2025, a delegation of Abkhaz entrepreneurs arrived in China, to participate in the Food2China Expo, a major international food and beverage trade exhibition held in the Chinese city of Guangzhou. Led by Tamila Mertskhulava, chair of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the breakaway state of Abkhazia, the entrepreneurs’ group spent three days – from September 25 to 27 – exhibiting products manufactured in Abkhazia. The delegation consequently met with representatives of the local Guangdong Chamber of Commerce, which led to the signing of a memorandum of cooperation, signaling an unprecedented engagement between a Chinese government-affiliated entity and the de facto authorities of Georgia’s Russian-backed breakaway region. Within two days, mentions of the memorandum disappeared from Abkhaz media platforms, underscoring the delicacy of the situation.

In the meantime, Chinese officials have long continued to advocate for expanding their relationship with the Georgian government. On September 29, while Abkhaz trade delegates were meeting with their Chinese counterparts, China’s ambassador to Georgia Zhou Qian reiterated Beijing’s desire to strengthen its partnership with Georgian Dream during his speech at an event in Tbilisi dedicated to the 76th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. On the same day, incumbent Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Kobakhidze in his statement referred to China “a model for all civilized nations dedicated to progress, modernization, and the promotion of global peace”, confirming his “full commitment and readiness” to strengthen cooperation with China “in all possible areas”.

While Beijing has long shown a steadily growing interest in Georgia, it has recently begun taking a double-edged approach towards it. This approach shows that Georgian Dream’s hope that Beijing can become a reliable partner that can help it to counterbalance the negative economic side effects of its recent geopolitical U-turn in its relations with the West could be a miscalculated endeavor.

More Than a Business Trip

For Abkhazia, long isolated on the international stage, the visit represented more than a business trip – it was a potential gateway to strengthening its legitimacy, investment, and markets. In her statement published on the website of the Abkhazia’s Chamber of Commerce, Mertskhulava emphasized that the trade turnover between China and Abkhazia “has been steadily increasing year by year” and attracting Chinese investment into various sectors of Abkhazia’s economy has become of a “particular importance” for the breakaway state. Local Telegram channels described the delegation’s presence as a “significant event”, highlighting that entering the Chinese market could eventually translate into tangible economic benefits and boost Abkhazia’s international positioning.

Yet, in practical terms, the memorandum is unlikely to spark any significant surge in trade. Chinese engagement with Abkhazia has so far been mostly symbolic encompassing online sales of low-cost Chinese goods promoted by Sukhumi-based influencers and sporadic visits by Chinese businessmen exploring the local investment environment. In 2021, a rare diplomatic contact occurred when China’s ambassador to Syria, Feng Biao, hosted Bagrat Khutaba, the de facto ambassador of Abkhazia. Such gestures have signaled that Beijing is carefully calculating to what extent it can test the waters without formally recognizing the territory.

Ever-Deepening Relations

Across the administrative line in Tbilisi-controlled Georgia, however, China’s footprint is far more substantial. Georgia’s strategic position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia makes it a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor connecting China to Europe – a role the country has sought to maximize, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted traditional routes through Moscow. To date, China’s footprint in Georgia is most evident in strategic infrastructure. Beginning in the early 2010s, Chinese construction firms – among them Sinohydro and China Railway 23rd Bureau Group – secured major contracts to build and modernize key sections of the East-West International Highway, the backbone of Georgia’s transit network. Throughout the 2010s and 2020s, Chinese companies have also pursued projects in the Black Sea region, including road links and logistics infrastructure tied to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reinforcing Beijing’s long-term interest in Georgia as a critical node in Eurasian connectivity.

The Sino-Georgian relationship was reinforced when the Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili visited China from in 2023 and issued a joint statement with the Chinese President Xi Jinping elevating two countries’ bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. The agreement pledged to deepen policy coordination, align development plans, and expand cooperation in political, economic, and cultural domains, as well as in international affairs. This formalization reflects the rapid evolution of Sino-Georgian ties over the past decade, driven largely by China’s BRI and Georgia’s ambition to become a major transit corridor between Europe and Asia. Economic indicators have also underscored the scale of this shift. By 2022, Georgian exports to China reached $737 million, while imports topped $1.25 billion, cementing China as Georgia’s third-largest trade partner.

The Anaklia deepwater port on the Black Sea, initially planned by the Anaklia Development Consortium in 2017, remains unbuilt, though the Georgian government has recently signaled renewed interest in reviving the project. In May 2024, Georgia’s Ministry of Economy announced that a Chinese-Singaporean consortium was selected as the private partner for the Anaklia Deep Sea Port. Beijing’s investment could be pivotal here, particularly as the Georgian government has gradually distanced itself from the West amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. A Chinese-led project would strengthen Georgia’s transit significance and integrate it further into the Middle Corridor – however it carries major strategic and political consequences.

One China, Two Standards

China’s economic engagement comes with political strings. The memorandum of understanding with Abkhazia may appear minor, albeit it demonstrates Beijing’s ability to engage in a dichotomous strategy: fostering economic ties with Tbilisi while maintaining ambiguous contacts with de jure Georgia’s breakaway territories. China strictly demands adherence to its “One China Policy” regarding the mainland and Taiwan, while Chinese officials appear comfortable pursuing a dichotomous approach toward Georgia – so long as it yields economic advantages for China and supports its Belt and Road ambitions. As significant as it is, Chinese diplomats rarely comment on Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia or South Ossetia, the way they do with Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. For instance, at the UN, China has even abstained from voting concerning the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Georgia’s breakaway regions, preserving its flexibility while expanding influence. During a 2024 interview with Georgia’s pro-government channel TV Imedi, Zhou Qian, China’s Ambassador to Georgia, avoided the question regarding China’s position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

For Georgian Dream, a closer relationship with China is an alternative to decreasing Western support amid strained relations with its key partners – the EU and the US. Georgia’s current government is seeking for support from China, firstly to alleviate economic impact of the undermined relations with the West. In the past years, it has thus increasingly opted for Chinese-led financial mechanisms, including loans from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

A Game of Unequals

The duality of China’s approach, however, creates a geopolitical puzzle. For Abkhazia, even symbolic gestures like the Guangdong memorandum grant a slight sense of legitimacy. For Tbilisi, Chinese investments procure immediate profits but with it come long-term strategic risks, potentially locking the country into economic overdependency and political influence. Ultimately, the Guangdong memorandum precedent with Abkhazia and, at the same time, the 2023 strategic partnership with Tbilisi exemplify China’s cautious but transactional approach towards Georgia. Beijing seeks to expand influence without formal entanglements in territorial disputes, balancing economic opportunity against political ambiguity.

Beijing’s moves are deliberate, patient, and strategic. Georgia can welcome the benefits of transit development and investment – but the country must also read the fine print. What seems like a profitable opportunity may, over time, become a leverage, shaping domestic politics, foreign policy, and regional balance in ways Tbilisi cannot fully control. Georgian Dream’s expectation that Beijing might serve as a reliable counterweight to the economic fallout of its turn away from the West is a miscalculated game. In the delicate chessboard of geopolitics, the key question is not whether China will invest – but on whose terms? China’s behavior and rhetoric make clear that the so-called strategic partnership is far from a relationship of equals.